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Abstract
Chapter 1: We propose an integral correction mechanism to model real exchange rate dynamics. In
estimation, we also allow a Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect on real exchange rate long-run equilibrium.
Using data from 19 OECD countries, we find the integral correction mechanism fitting in-sample data
significantly better than the popular smooth transition autoregression model. The special dynamics of
the integral correction mechanism help explain the PPP puzzle by distinguishing mean-reversion speeds
in the long- and short- run. However, the integral correction mechanism shows a significant out-of-sample
forecast gain over the random walk in only few cases. Though the gain is robust across forecast horizons
and quite large at long horizons.
Chapter 2: This chapter evaluates the ability of a standard IRBC model augmented with an input
adjustment cost of imported goods to explain different aspects of the real exchange rate like the standard
deviation, the autocorrelation function, the spectrum and the integral correction mechanism. I find that
the simple IRBC model with an appropriate calibration can well capture all features of the real exchange
rate. The input adjustment cost plays the key role. As compared to the standard model, it implies a
reversed impulse response of the real exchange rate with a fast speed going back to steady state and
introduces a long-run cyclical movement in most macroeconomic variables. I find that this particular
impulse response helps explain the PPP puzzle.
Chapter 3: I study optimal unconventional monetary policy under commitment in a two-country model
where domestic policy entails larger spillovers to foreign countries. Equity injections into financial
intermediaries turn out to be more efficient than discount window lending and the large-scale asset
purchases that have been employed in many countries. Due to precautionary effects of future crises, a
central bank should exit from its policy more slowly than the speed of deleveraging in the financial sector.
The optimal policy can be changed considerably if cross-country policy cooperation is not imposed. In
this case, interventions tend to be too strong in one country but too weak in the other. Gains from
cooperation become positive if using unconventional monetary policy is costly enough, then correlates
positively with the cost.
Chapter 4: I consider implementation of optimal unconventional monetary policy outlined in chapter 3.
I find the Ramsey policy characterised by a simple rules responding to gaps in asset prices. However, it
requires knowledge of asset prices that would be realized in a world free of financial friction so cannot be
used to guide unconventional monetary policy in practice. The best practical simple rule responds to
credit spread with inertia.
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Foreword
The purchasing power parity (PPP) puzzle is one of the six major puzzles in the field of international
macroeconomics identified by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000), and is still puzzling to economists today. The
literature approaches this puzzle from two angles. Empirical researchers take a stance that real factors,
such as preference and productivity, cannot explain the high volatility of real exchange rates. They aim
to show that the degree of persistence in the real exchange rate is consistent with the time frame in which
nominal shocks can have substantial real effects. A lower degree of persistence has been found using, for
example, nonlinear models in which real exchange rates revert to their long-run equilibrium faster in
the presence of larger deviation. Though it is not clear if the degree of persistence is low enough to be
explained by nominal shocks. On the other hand, theorists add channels for the propagation of either
real or nominal shocks such that a theoretical model can generate volatility and persistence close to data.
However, they mainly focus on the business cycle frequencies.
The success of the literature is imperfect, and the two strands of literature are to a large extent isolated.
In chapter one and two, I contribute to the theory and the empirics of exchange rate determination
separately. I propose an empirical model called integral correction mechanism (ICM) to capture real
exchange rate dynamics. It implies that the real exchange rate responds to an unidentified shock non-
monotonically. The real exchange rate reverts to its long-run equilibrium quickly in the short-run but
persistently move around the equilibrium. Hence the PPP puzzle can be understood by distinguishing
between degrees of persistence in the short-run and the long-run. I formally evaluate both the in-sample
and out-of-sample performance of ICM taking the popular smooth transition autoregression (STAR)
model as a benchmark. For the in-sample fitness, the ICM does significantly better than the STAR for
most countries considered. The ICM exhibits an out-of-sample forecast gain for only a few countries.
However, when it does, the gain is substantial. It is therefore worth considering the ICM forecast as a
candidate at least.
In the second chapter, I aim to obtain a deeper understanding the ICM. I show that a standard
two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model augmented with an input adjustment
cost can generate real exchange rate dynamics similar to the ICM. The micro-foundation underlying
this type of dynamics is a time-varying price elasticity of tradable goods such that international trade is
less responsive to terms of trade in the short-run. Calibration exercises show that the DSGE model can
capture all the time series properties of real exchange rates at all frequencies. However, the calibrated
parameters implies a short-run trade elasticity smaller than that suggested by micro-evidence. The second
chapter also makes a contribution by bridging the empirical and theoretical literature.
The third and fourth chapters are separated from the previous ones and focus on optimal cooperative
and non-cooperative unconventional monetary policy (UMP). Since the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the
so-called unconventional monetary policy has been employed by many major central banks to provide
liquidity and affect credit conditions at a large scale. For example, the Federal Reserve mainly used
an expanded discount window in the early stage of the 2007-2008 crisis. After the Lehmann failure,
the Fed started its asset purchase programs (quantitative easing, or QE) and injected equity into the
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financial system. The Fed started to taper the QE at the end of 2013, and ceased it in October 2014,
after which the Federal Reserve has kept the size of its balance sheet constant by buying just enough
to replace maturing securities. The European Central Bank (ECB) employed two series of Targeted
longer-term refinancing operations in June 2014 and March 2016 respectively. The ECB initialized its
asset purchase programs at a relatively small scale, slightly later than the Federal Reserve. The ECB
formally introduced QE in 2015 and further increased the amount purchased in late 2016. The ECB also
used equity injections during this period.
UMP could entail large cross-country spillovers with internationally integrated financial markets. If
quantitative easing focuses on an asset that is either itself traded internationally or closely substitutive to
internationally traded assets, foreign credit conditions are also affected. The spillovers make cross-country
policy cooperation potentially welfare improving. There has been much work devoted to evaluating the
effectiveness of UMP. However, the nominative perspective of UMP theory is still blank. In the third
chapter, I study Ramsey UMP and draw two conclusions. First, effective UMP should be designed to
relaxes financial constraints that banks face. Otherwise, the UMP largely crowds out private funds and
will be painfully long-lasting. However, regardless of the policy design, a central bank should exit slowly
due to a precautionary effect. Second, welfare gain of policy cooperation is a weakly increasing function
of the intervention cost. There is no gain if the intervention cost is small. Increasing the intervention cost
to a certain point generates positive gains. In the noncooperative equilibrium, the interventions are too
strong in one country but too weak in the other.
Ramsey policy is silent regarding implementation. In the fourth chapter, I consider policy imple-
mentations via simple rules. The main contribution is to design the best practical policy guided by the
optimal results. In the literature, a naive policy focusing on credit spreads is employed. I find that the
optimal policy is characterised by a rule responding to asset price gaps. However, it requires knowledge
of asset prices that would be realized in a world free of financial friction so cannot be used to guide
unconventional monetary policy in practice. The best practical simple rule responds to credit spread
with inertia. I discuss the intuition of this rule, which is different than that argued in the literature.
Chapter 1
Understanding the PPP puzzle:
dynamics of real exchange rates
towards their time-varying
equilibrium
This chapter is co-authored with my supervisor Prof Gabriel Talmain
1.1 Introduction
The first prediction of real exchange rate movements is given by the well-known purchasing power parity
(PPP) hypothesis, justified by frictionless international goods arbitrage. The PPP hypothesis suggests
that real exchange rates should be stationary time series with a constant unconditional mean. Although
much evidence supporting stationary real exchange rates has been found (Taylor, 2009), economists are
surprised by their extremely slow mean-reversion, at least when the reversion speeds are measured by
standard methods which assume constant real exchange rate equilibrium and a (proportionally) constant
reversion speed. Rogoff (1996) asks how to reconcile the slow mean-reversion with a high real exchange
rate volatility, which is known as the PPP puzzle.
In the literature, there are at least two reasons why true mean-reversion speeds can be faster than those
measured by standard methods. First, low-frequency movements of real exchange rates can be explained
by time-varying equilibrium, which is driven by real shocks, such as productivity shocks, according to
the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa, 1964; Harrod, 1933; Samuelson, 1964, HBS). The key to
the HBS effect is a sector of nontradable goods subject to no international arbitrage. Second, dynamics
of real exchange rates towards their equilibrium can be nonlinear such that mean-reversion is faster in
the presence of larger deviations, like the smooth transition autoregression (STAR) model of (Taylor
et al., 2001). Therefore, estimates of mean reversion speeds are biased under the assumption of constant
equilibrium and a constant reversion speed.
In this chapter, we revisit the PPP puzzle by proposing a new type of dynamics referred to as
integral correction mechanism (ICM). The ICM features persistent oscillations around the equilibrium
with quick mean-reversion in the short-run. It suggests that a shock (possibly a real one) can generate
enormous short-term volatility and damp out at extremely slow rates, so the PPP puzzle is less puzzling.
Furthermore, the ICM suggests paying attention to the entire impulse response function or the entire
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autocorrelation function. By contrast, the common practice in the literature is to summarize real exchange
rate dynamics by half-lives of shocks and the first few orders of autocorrelation. As shown by Jiang
(2017), the ICM can be understood by time-varying trade elasticities such that import and export goods
are less responsive to their prices in the short-run than in the long-run. In estimating the ICM, we also
allow the HBS effect, i.e., time-varying equilibrium. We employ the version of Bordo et al. (2017) in
which the HBS effect works through a direct channel and a terms of trade channel.
Using data from the US and 18 OECD countries during the post-Bretton-Woods period, we estimate
the ICM model and a benchmark STAR model that is popular in the literature. Our findings are
threefold. First, we establish that the ICM model fits in-sample data statistically better than the STAR
model. The origin of this superiority is that the ICM can capture autocorrelation functions (ACF) of real
exchange rates very well. Second, regarding the HBS effect, we find the terms of trade channel statistically
significant in more countries than the direct channel. This is expected because of our relatively short
span of data. At last, we evaluate the out-of-sample performance of both models. The ICM beats random
walk forecasts for only 4 out of 18 real exchange rates. However, when it does, the ICM can predict real
exchange rates at both short and long horizons. The STAR, on the other hand, can beat random walk
forecasts for 17 real exchange rates, though not always significantly. The two models seem complementary
to each other in the sense that the ICM often shows significant forecast gain when the STAR does not,
and vice versa. Incorporating time-varying equilibrium often helps forecast using both models.
Our main contribution to the literature is proposing the ICM model as a statistically and economically
better representation of real exchange rates than the STAR model. The STAR model, its variants, and
other similar regime-switching models have been prevailing in the literature in the last two decades.1
Roughly speaking, early work of Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), Engel and Kim (1999) and Taylor et al.
(2001) popularise threshold, Markov, and smooth transition regime-switching models, respectively.2 In
STAR, mean reversion speeds are faster with relatively rare, larger shocks. Norman (2010) concludes
that the reversion speeds faster than the consensus are observed frequently enough to support STAR as a
solution to the PPP puzzle. However, Yoon (2010) applies a nonparametric measure of serial dependence
to real exchange rates, which threshold and smooth transition models struggle to replicate. This is where
this chapter comes in.
Our modelling strategy generally follows the recent literature of modelling nonlinear mean reversion
speeds and time-varying equilibrium jointly.3 While smooth transition are routinely employed to capture
the mean reversion process, real exchange rate equilibrium is modelled in various ways. For example,
Lothian and Taylor (2008) and Peltonen et al. (2011) focuses on the HBS effect. Paya and Peel (2006) and
Boero et al. (2015) further allow a capital account effect that currency tends to appreciate in real terms
1The common justifications for these types of models include: 1) the presence of the transaction cost causing a greater
goods arbitrage when the real exchange rate misalignment grows (Dumas, 1992; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; Parsley and
Wei, 1996; Sarno et al., 2004; Taylor and Kim, 2009); 2) A growing degree of consensus concerning the appropriate or likely
direction of a nominal exchange rate movement among traders (Kilian and Taylor, 2003); 3) A greater likelihood of the
occurrence and success of the intervention by authorities to correct a strongly misaligned exchange rate (Reitz and Taylor,
2008; Sarno et al., 2004; Taylor, 2004). Ahmad et al. (2013) examine if a real exchange rate governed by STAR can be
generated by a medium-scale two-country DSGE model. Their model features incomplete international financial markets,
local currency pricing, home bias and nontradable goods.
2They are, of course, not the first to apply these models on exchange rates. Engel and Hamilton (1990) and Engel (1994)
apply Markov switching models on nominal exchange rates. Michael et al. (1997) use a exponential smooth transition model
to test unit roots. Followers of these models are plenty. Bergman and Hansson (2005) focuses on the forecast performance
of Market switching models. Kruse et al. (2012) run a competition between Markov switching and smooth transition. It’s
often believed that threshold models are more appropriate than smooth transition models for sectoral data. Juvenal and
Taylor (2008) use a threshold model to test the Law Of One Price (LOOP). However, there are also examples of mixed
match of models and data, see Nakagawa (2010) and Kim and Moh (2011).
3There is a stand-alone literature focusing on real exchange rate equilibrium only. A incomplete list: Chinn (2000), Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), Chen and Rogoff (2003), Lee and Tang (2003), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), MacDonald and
Ricci (2005), Choudhri and Khan (2005), MacDonald and Ricci (2007), Thomas and King (2008), Chong et al. (2012), Ricci
et al. (2013). Overall, evidence supporting the HBS effect is mixed (Taylor and Taylor, 2004), but more evidence is found
using long-span data over centuries.
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in the presence of accumulation of net foreign assets. Specifically, Boero et al. (2015) find a long-run
relationship between real exchange rates, productivity differentials, real interest rate differentials and the
capital account. Since real exchange rate equilibrium can be affected by a wide range of variables, Taylor
and Kim (2009) and Kim (2012) summarise information in those variables by a few unobservable factors.
Béreau et al. (2010) consider an alternative so-called Behavioral Equilibrium of exchange rates.
This chapter also contributes to the literature of real exchange rate predictability, particularly at
short horizons. Results in the literature are mixed. Indeed, as pointed out by Rogoff and Stavrakeva
(2008) and Rossi (2013), this is partially due to different data, models, evaluation methods employed
in different studies. Early work of Kilian and Taylor (2003) and Rapach and Wohar (2006) find that,
for post-Bretton Woods period data, STAR model can outperform simple linear autoregressive models
and a random walk in terms of out-of-sample forecasting at short but not at long horizons (2 to 3 years).
Buncic (2012) finds no forecast gains of STAR models at any horizon. The author demonstrates that
the nonlinearity in the conditional means of STAR models decreases as the forecast horizon increases.
López-Suárez and Rodríguez-López (2011) find results in favour of STAR even at short horizons using
a panel smooth transition error-correction model. Pavlidis et al. (2012) also find STAR favourable in
terms of forecasting for long-span dollar-sterling real exchange rates. Kim (2012) argue that the poor
out-of-sample forecasting performance of STAR model in the literature may be caused by the lack of
properly modelled real exchange rate equilibrium. We confirm this argument in this chapter.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents a modern version of the
HBS effect. Section 1.3 discusses real exchange rate equilibrium, the ICM and STAR model, separately.
Data is described in section 1.4. Then, we report in-sample results in section 1.5 and discuss economic
significance of the ICM in section 1.6. Section 1.7 evaluates out-of-sample performance. The last section
concludes.
1.2 The Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect
The intuition of the standard HBS hypothesis is as follows. Consider a two-sector economy. There is a
tradable sector where the the Law Of One Price (LOOP) holds and a nontradable sector subject to no
international arbitrage. The standard HBS hypothesis assumes that productivity in the tradable sector
grows faster than in the nontradable sector. Since capital flows across countries but labour can only
transfer between domestic sectors, growth of the tradable sector productivity pushes up the wages in
both sectors. While prices of tradable goods do not necessarily rise, nontradable goods become more
expensive as compared to tradable goods. Consequently, the overall price index rises and appreciates the
real exchange rate.
In this chapter, we employ a variety of the standard HBS effect proposed by Bordo et al. (2017).
This variety features production specialisation of each country and monopolistic competition, which are
fairly standard in the literature of two-country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
Consider a world economy that consists of two countries, Home and Foreign. Each country contains
two sectors: the nontradable sector, the country-specialized tradable sector. There are nN , nH (nF )
firms producing differentiable goods in each sector. LOOP holds for tradable sectors. We focus on Home
equations in the following and denote Foreign variables with a superscript “*”. Goods are aggregated as
follows:
C = C
γ
NC
(1−γ)
T
γγ (1− γ)(1−γ)
,
CT =
[
(χHCH)
(η−1)
η + (χFCF )
(η−1)
η
] η
(η−1)
,
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CN =
[∫ nN
i=1
CN (i)
(σ−1)
σ di
] σ
(σ−1)
,
CH =
[∫ nH
i=1
CH(i)
(σ−1)
σ di
] σ
(σ−1)
,
CF =
[∫ nF
i=1
CF (i)
(σ−1)
σ di
] σ
(σ−1)
,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of nontraded goods in total expenditure, χH ∈ (0, 1) and χF ∈ (0, 1) are
preference parameters for Home and Foreign goods, η and σ are the positive elasticity of substitution,
C, CT , CH , and CF are appropriate aggregate goods, and the index i indicates varieties in each sector.
Minimizing the cost of consuming one unit of aggregate goods results in the corresponding price indexes:
P = P γNP
(1−γ)
T ,
PT =
[(
PH
χH
)1−η
+
(
τPF
χF
)1−η] 11−η
,
PN =
[∫ nN
i=1
PN (i)1−σdi
] 1
(1−σ)
= n
1
(1−σ)
N PN (i),
PH =
[∫ nH
i=1
PH(i)1−σdi
] 1
(1−σ)
= n
1
(1−σ)
H PH(i),
τPF =
[∫ nF
i=1
(τPF (i))1−σ di
] 1
(1−σ)
= n
1
(1−σ)
F τPF (i),
where P , PT , PN , PH , and τPF are appropriate real price indexes, the second equation of PN , PH , and
τPF uses symmetry across firms, andτ > 1 is an iceberg cost of international trade. Real exchange rate q
is the relative price of C in terms of C∗, q ≡ PP∗ . Terms of trade is the relative price of export in terms
of import tot ≡ PHτPF .
The production function for each goods variety is Yj (i) = AjLj (i) , j = N,H where Aj is sector-wide
productivity, and Lj (i) is labour input. Each firm maximises its profit and sets the price with a markup
over the marginal cost, Pj (j) = σσ−1
w
Aj , where w is the real domestic wage rate.
Substituting the definitions of price indexes and the monopolistic pricing conditions into the definition
of the real exchange rate gives
q =
[
n
1
(1−σ)
N
σ
σ−1
w
AN
]γ (n 1(1−σ)H σσ−1 wAHχH
)1−η
+
 τn 1(1−σ)F σσ−1 w∗A∗F
χF
1−η

1−γ
1−η
[
n
∗ 1(1−σ)
N
σ
σ−1
w∗
A∗
N
]γ ( τn 1(1−σ)H σσ−1 wAHχ∗H
)1−η
+
n 1(1−σ)F σσ−1 w∗A∗F
χ∗
F
1−η

1−γ
1−η
.
Then applying log linearisation, we obtain 4
qˆ =
[
γ
(
AˆH − AˆN
)
− γ∗
(
Aˆ∗F − Aˆ∗N
)]
+
[
γ (nˆH − nˆN )− γ∗
(
nˆ∗F − nˆ∗N
)]
/ (σ − 1)
+
[
γ
(
1− χη−1H
)
+ γ∗
(
χ∗H
τ
)η−1
+
(
1− χη−1H
)
−
(
χ∗H
τ
)η−1]
ˆtot
, (1.1)
4The full model can be found in the NBER working paper version of Bordo et al. (2017).
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where variables with a hat are in log deviations from their steady states. The first term in equation 1.1
captures the standard HBS effect. The second term shows due to monopolistic competition. The third
term captures a terms of trade channel. While the LOOP always holds for each variety of tradable goods,
PPP does not hold for price indexes in the short-run due to the imperfect substitution between Home
and Foreign tradable goods, and the preference toward domestic specialised goods represented by χH .
Bordo et al. (2017) show that the terms of trade channel can diminish or even reverse the standard HBS
effect, depending on the relative degree of preference toward domestic specialised goods χη−1H −
(
χ∗H
τ
)η−1
.
Furthermore, the endogenous entry & exit (movement in the number of firms) of firms due to monopolistic
competition magnifies the standard HBS effect.
1.3 The econometric models
1.3.1 Real exchange rate equilibrium
We model real exchange rate equilibrium as a log linear function of cross-country differentials of real
GDP per capital, rgdpt, terms of trade, tott, and a trade balance to GDP ratio tbt:
ln qEQt = a0 + a1 ln rgdpt + a2 ln tott + a3tbt. (1.2)
The first two explanatory variables captures the HBS effect, as motivated in the last section. As standard
in the literature, we use real GDP per capita as a proxy for productivity mainly because productivity data
is not available for all countries in our sample. 5 The fluctuates in terms of trade reflect not only supply
side shocks, as in the HBS hypothesis, but possibly also demand side factors such as income-elasticity of
nontradable consumption. Incorporating terms of trade could be particularly important for countries
relying on exporting primary commodity (Chen and Rogoff, 2003). While equation 1.1 is derived from a
static model, dynamic general equilibrium models such as those developed in Benigno and Thoenissen
(2003) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2002 suggest including the trade balance in the equilibrium relationship.
Intuitively, a country in debt needs a trade surplus to service its external liabilities. In the long-run
equilibrium, the real exchange rate must depreciate to improve the competitiveness of this country. There
are possibly other variables determining real exchange rate in the long-run. But these three variables are
the most commonly employed ones in the literature, see the literature review in the introduction.
Denoting real exchange rate misalignment as errt = ln qt − ln qEQt , we proceed to describe dynamics
that govern movements of the misalignment. The complete models are described by equation 1.2 and the
equations that specify the dynamics.
1.3.2 The integral correction mechanism
The ICM 6 is given by
errt =
p∑
j=1
βecmj errt−j + βicmiet−1 + εt,icm, (1.3)
5We take the ratio between Home’s and Foreign’s real GDP per capita and let it enter the equation as a single explanatory
variable. As an alternative, Home’s and Foreign’s real GDP per capita may enter the equation separately. If doing so, we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on each of the two variables have the same value with opposite signs;
hence, we keep the specification in equation 1.2.
6This mechanism is first proposed by Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981) and employed by Abadir and Talmain
(2012) in a different context.
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where iet =
∑t
i=0 erri denotes integral error, βicm ≤ 0 determines the correction of integral error, βecmj
satisfies the stationary condition for an AR(p) process, and εt,icm ∼ N
(
0, σ2icm
)
is the residual. The
βecmj errt−j terms introduce long memory in a parsimonious way. The integral error implies that the
force driving the real exchange rate back to its equilibrium is stronger when the real exchange rate is
away from its equilibrium for a longer period of time. The history dependent real exchange rate could
be a result of incomplete international financial market. To understand the ICM dynamics, consider a
positive shock. If βecmj implies a stationary AR(P) process, the misalignment will be corrected gradually
and meanwhile, the integral error is built up at a decreasing rate. As βicm < 0, the real exchange rate
misalignment reverts to zero more quickly than a pure AR process. The integral error reaches it maximum
when the real exchange rate returns to the equilibrium. However, the integral error keeps driving the real
exchange rate to the other side of its equilibrium, so that the real exchange rate is undervalued. The
dynamics stop when both iet and errt are zero. The ICM is similar to a physical pendulum. Let the real
exchange rate be a massive bob hanged by a rod, the bottom position being the equilibrium. Given a
shock, the real exchange rate moves back and forth around its equilibrium periodically because iet stores
the “momentum” of movement until the momentum is drained by air friction. βecmj captures the role of
air friction.
1.3.3 The smooth transition autoregression
We use the popular STAR model (Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993; Teräsvirta, 1994) as a benchmark. Real
exchange rate dynamics governed by the STAR (p, d) can be written as
errt =
p∑
j=1
βecmj errt−j +
 p∑
j=1
βecm∗j errt−j
×G (θ, d) + εt,star, (1.4)
where εt,star ∼ N
(
0, σ2star
)
, and G (θ, d) controls a smooth transition between two regimes represented
by βecmj and βecm∗j . The transition may take one of two forms. The model exhibits exponential STAR
(ESTAR) dynamics if
G (θ, d) =
[
1− exp
[
θ (errt−d)2
]]
, (1.5)
and exhibits logistic STAR (LSTAR) dynamics if
G (θ, d) = [1 + exp [θerrt−d]]−1 , (1.6)
where θ determines the speed of the transition. The STAR model can be considered as an AR model for
real exchange rate misalignment with time-varying coefficients governed by the function G (θ, d):
errt =
p∑
j=1
βt,jerrt−j . (1.7)
If the model follows the ESTAR, the time-varying AR coefficients βt,j vary between βj when errt−d = 0
and βj + β∗j when errt−d = ±∞. In contrast, if the model follows the LSTAR, βt,j varies between βj
when errt−d = +∞ and βj + β∗j when errt−d = −∞ and equals βj + β
∗
j
2 when errt−d = 0. Therefore, the
ESTAR implies symmetric dynamics while the LSTAR implies asymmetric dynamics.
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1.4 Data
We estimate both the ICM model and the STAR model using quarterly data over the period 1973Q2-
2013Q47 for 18 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom. Ideally, the data should be collected for each of the 18 OECD countries and their
trading partners. Then, the data from the trading partners is weighted averaged by the trade share to
represent the Foreign country. Since data on bilateral trade shares is not always available, we choose the
United States as the reference country.
Data is collected from IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and OECD’s Outlook
database. The real exchange rate, q, is defined as units of the US goods per unit of home country goods
and calculated using CPI. The terms of trade, tot, is calculated as the ratio between export and import
deflators for goods and services. The trade balance to GDP ratio, tb, is defined as the net export of goods
and services as a proportion of GDP. Throughout this chapter, all variables are expressed in natural
logarithm except tb. Detailed data sources can be found in appendix A.3.
1.5 Empirical analysis
1.5.1 Stationarity tests
Before taking data to the econometric models, we test the stationarity of the real exchange rate or its
misalignment, errt. The results are reported in table 1.1. We first apply traditional tests. The Augmented
Dicky-Fuller test (ADF) test only rejects nonstationary for the UK-US real exchange rate. For all other
countries, we test cointegration between real exchange rates with the three variables8 that explain the
real exchange rate equilibrium, using the Engle-Granger cointegration test (EG-tau and EG-z). We only
find weak evidence of cointegration for Canada and New Zealand. However, due to the well-known low
power of these tests, not rejecting the nonstationarity should be interpreted as these series at least being
very persistent. Next, we test global stationarity in the STAR model against a random walk. We use the
t(ESTAR) test of Kılıç (2011), which is claimed to have a stronger power as compared to alternatives
such as that of Kapetanios et al. (2003). Overall, the t(ESTAR) test finds strong evidence in favour of
the stationary STAR model. The only exception is Portugal, for which we test cointegration in the STAR
framework by Kapetanios et al. (2006, KSS)’s test9 and the null of no cointegration can be rejected.
Ideally, we would also like to test stationarity in the ICM model against a random walk. As no
such test is available, we obtained some sense of stationarity in the ICM model by using the method
proposed in Abadir and Talmain (2012). To be specific, the dynamics represented by the ICM can also
be represented by a highly flexible parametric autocorrelation function (ACF) given as
ρτ =
1− a [1− cos (ωτ)]
1 + bτ c , (1.8)
where ρτ is the autocorrelation of order τ , and a, b, c, and ω are parameters. Abadir et al. (2013) find
that this ACF is flexible enough to capture the dynamics of a wide range of macroeconomic variables
7Using long-span data, Lothian and Taylor (2008) and Bergin et al. (2006) argue that real exchange rate volatility and
the HBS effect are time-varying. By focusing on the post-Bretton-Woods period, we are satisfied to assume that constant
volatility and the HBS effect.
8Only those variables for which the ADF test cannot reject unit-roots are included in the cointegration test.
9The tests of Kılıç (2011) and Kapetanios et al. (2006, KSS) are designed for ESTAR in particular. The KSS test can
only be used to test stationarity in the LSTAR in certain contexts, as suggested by the authors. According to our knowledge,
no unit-root test is available for LSTAR.
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Table 1.1: Unit root tests for real exchange rates
Country ADF EG-tau EG-z t(ESTAR) KSS
Australia -1.87 -2.96 -16.76 -2.20* -
Austria -2.63* -2.76 -15.40 -2.82** -
Belgium -2.04 -3.59 -23.00 -2.35* -
Canada -1.86 -3.87* -23.80 -4.01*** -
Denmark -2.10 -2.86 -15.88 -3.63*** -
Finland -2.26 -2.85 -14.69 -2.48** -
France -2.38 -2.45 -11.41 -2.74** -
Germany -2.44 -2.05 -8.792 -2.91** -
Italy -2.03 -3.01 -16.97 -2.76** -
Japan -2.18 -1.92 -7.443 -3.10*** -
Netherlands -2.32 -2.27 -10.50 -3.13*** -
New Zealand -2.04 -3.72* -22.44* -3.64*** -
Norway -2.84* -2.86 -15.65 -2.98*** -
Portugal -0.95 -2.01 -11.14 -1.24 -4.80***
Spain -2.24 -3.62 -18.56 -2.62** -
Sweden -2.41 -2.69 -14.18 -3.00*** -
Switzerland -2.49 -2.84 -15.97 -2.90** -
United Kingdom -2.94** - - -3.74*** -
Numbers are statistics of each test.
*, **, *** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
and aggregate financial variables. The stationary conditions10 are b > 0 and c > 0. We use maximum
likelihood to jointly estimate the parameters in equation 1.8 and in the following equation11
qt = a0 + a1 ln rgdpt + a2 ln tott + a3tbt + errt, (1.9)
where the ACF of errt follows equation 1.8. Figure 1.1 reports estimates of ρτ , and the empirical ACF of
errt. Equation 1.8 seems to capture the dynamics of the real exchange rate very well, and we find the
stationarity conditions to be satisfied for all real exchange rates. The ACFs slump to a negative level and
move cyclically around zero with a decaying magnitude. This particular shape of the ACF suggests that
the real exchange rate is transitory in the short run but persistent in the long run, which could be the
reason why standard tests struggle to reject a unit root. As we will show shortly, our ICM model can
capture the ACF very well while other models cannot.
1.5.2 Model specifications
Before estimating models, we select the order of autoregression p, the lag of smooth transition d, and
choose between LSTAR and ESTAR.
Following Lothian and Taylor (2008), we pick a p based on partial autocorrelation functions (PACF) of
real exchange rates and the real exchange rate misalignment. Most real exchange rates have no significant
PACF beyond the first order. The exceptions are Canada, Portugal, and the UK. However, the real
exchange rate misalignment, errt, of these three countries has no significant PACF beyond the first
order.12 Therefore, we take p = 1 for all countries and omit the index j.
The conventional economic intuition suggests a smaller value of d and a symmetric ESTAR. It is hard
to imagine that real exchange rates move asymmetrically around the equilibrium and wait a long time
before switching regimes. Recently, Ahmad et al. (2013) examine the STAR model in an open economy
10To be precise, these conditions are for a concept that is slightly more general than covariance stationary as this concept
allows a time-varying unconditional mean
11See appendix A.4 for technical details. We also apply this method with constant qEQt and find similar results.12We obtain errt by estimating equations 1.8 and 1.9.
1.5 Empirical analysis 11
Figure 1.1: Estimated and empirical ACF of errt
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Table 1.2: Model estimation for the UK
LSTAR (1,8) ICM
a0 0.53 {0.05} a0 0.48 {0.13}
a1 -0.01 {0.98} a1 0.01 {0.97}
a2 0.08 {0.75} a2 0.03 {0.89}
a3 0.80 {0.14} a3 0.69 {0.15}
βecm 1 (fixed) βecm 0.92 (29.28)
θ -8.46 (-0.92) {0.14} -
βecm∗ -0.16 (-2.36) βicm -0.03 (-5.00) {0.00}
σstar 0.05 σicm 0.05
R2 0.83 R2 0.85
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.01} Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.31}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.97} Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.42}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.40} Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.56}
Note: number in () and {} are t-statstics and P-value, respectively.
Diagnostic: AR(1), ARCH(1), nonlinearity are Lagrange Multiplier tests for neglected autocorrelation,
heteroscedasticity and nonlinearity, respectively.
DSGE model. They find that the DSGE model with home bias and a nontradable sector yields real
exchange rate consistent with ESTAR. Introducing local currency pricing may generate a real exchange
rate that is described by the LSTAR. A large delay parameter d is found in the DSGE model with both
local currency pricing and an incomplete financial market. Formally, we go through the specification
produces described in Teräsvirta (1994) and find that the LSTAR describes most real exchange rates and
d ranges from 1 to 8.
Finally, the literature (Lothian and Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2001) usually imposes constraints such
as, βecm = 1, and βecm∗ = −1, and find no evidence to reject them. These constraints make the ESTAR
model easy to interpret because the real exchange rate misalignment switches between a random walk
and a white noise. Less restrictive constraints are sometime imposed, such as βecm = −βecm∗ (Paya and
Peel, 2006), or βecm = 1 (Kılıç, 2011). In this chapter, we impose βecm = −βecm∗ on the ESTAR model
and |βecm| ≤ 1 and |βecm + βecm∗| ≤ 1 on the LSTAR model.
1.5.3 Estimation results
We estimate the ICM model (equations 1.2 and 1.3) and the STAR model (equations 1.2 and 1.4) for
each country separately by maximum likelihood. The results for the UK are reported in table 1.2. To
save space, other results are reported in table A.1 and table A.2 in the appendix.
The key parameters that govern the dynamics of the STAR model and the ICM model are θ and βicm,
respectively. If they equal zero, the model reduces to a standard AR. To test their statistic significant,
we construct the distribution of their t-statistics by Monte Carlo simulations as in Lothian and Taylor
(2008). Under the null hypothesis of θ = 0, and the assumption of βecm = 1, the model is nonstationary
so the standard distribution does not apply.. Under the null of βicm ≥ 0, the model is either a standard
AR or explosive so we expect the distribution of βicm to be right skewed. To be specific, we simulate the
estimated model under the null by 5000 times. Each time we generate a real exchange rate, initilised
at 0, of length 100+ the number of observations in data. The first 100 points are then discarded. We
estimate the STAR or the ICM for each simulation and form a empirical distribution for the t-statistics
considered. We cannot reject θ = 0 for most countries13 with the exceptions of Denmark, Italy, Sweden
13Teräsvirta (1994) devises another test for the same purpose, by which we can reject θ = 0 for more countries. However,
Kilic (2004) and Sandberg 2008 suggest that the size of Teräsvirta (1994)’s test can be distorted. When the test is applied
to a linear but nonstationary or a highly persistent data generating process, the null hypothesis of linearity is rejected too
often. Moreover, Ahmad et al. (2013) find that Teräsvirta (1994)’s test suffers from an omitted exogenous variables problem,
which may mislead the results as we included an exogenous time-varying equilibrium of the real exchange rate.
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and Switzerland. Nevertheless, this result is sensitive to the delay parameter d. We can reject βicm ≥ 0
for most countries, namely Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the UK at a 5% level
of significance, and additionally Australia, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, and
Switzerland at a 10% level of significance.
The estimated coefficients in equation 1.2 are similar in the ICM model and the STAR model.
Consistent with the literature (Taylor and Taylor, 2004), the real GDP per capita differential has a small
coefficient in [−0.4,+0.4]. As discussed in section 1.2, the overall HBS effect can be reduced or even
reversed by the terms of trade channel. Nevertheless, given that we have controlled the terms of trade,
the coefficient a1 should mainly capture the direct HBS effect. In addition, the standard t-test cannot
reject the null hypothesis of no direct HBS effect for all countries. This could be due to the fact that our
data span is not long enough to capture the long-run HBS effect. Furthermore, Paya and Peel (2006)
suggest that the standard t-test gives spurious results if the explanatory variables are very persistent.
This is indeed our case. Following Paya and Peel (2006), we construct small sample distributions by
bootstrap for a1, a2, and a3. Some evidence for the direct HBS effect can be found since a1 is significant
in 9 out of 18 countries. The terms of trade channel of the HBS effect, i.e., the coefficient a2, is significant
in 14 out of 18 countries. The coefficient of the trade balance is usually negative and significant in 17 out
of 18 countries, which suggests that the real exchange rate also tends to move in such a direction that the
value of Home’s external liabilities decreases in terms of domestic goods.
Finally, we notice that, with a few exceptions, there is no further autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity,
and nonlinearity in the residual of the STAR model. However, in the ICM model, we detect a neglected
nonlinearity for Denmark, Italy and Norway, which suggests a missing smooth transition mechanism. We
investigate this possibility in the next subsection.
1.5.4 In-sample fitness
We compare in-sample fitness of ICM and STAR by likelihood ratio tests. To begin, we construct a model
nesting both, referred to as ST-ICM:
errt =
p∑
j=1
βecmj errt−j +
 p∑
j=1
βecm∗j errt−j
×G (θ, d) + βicmiet−1 + εt,sticm.
Then, we test if this model is superior to the ICM and the STAR in terms of log likelihood. If the ICM is
the true data generating process, we expect to find the ST-ICM not significantly superior to the ICM
but significantly superior to the STAR. As reported in table 1.3,14 we find the results consistent with
our expectation for 12 countries. For the remaining countries, Denmark, Italy, Norway, and Sweden
show that the ST-ICM is significantly better than both the STAR and the ICM. This result suggests
some nonlinearity similar to STAR in their true data generating processes. In fact, we detect neglected
nonlinearity in ICM residuals using data from these countries. For Austria and Canada, the ST-ICM is
not significantly better than either the STAR or the ICM. This is not surprising as their real exchange
rate dynamics look quite different than others, indicated by figure 1.1.
To investigate the possible origin of superiority of the ICM, we report ACFs calculated from the data
and models for the UK in figure 1.2. The ICM’s ACF fits the data remarkably well, in particular the
cyclical pattern. On the other hand, the STAR’s ACF decreases monotonically and is roughly in line with
long-run “trend” of the data’s ACF. By design, STAR only allows nonlinear changes in mean-reversion
speeds but not the mean-reversion directions.
14The results in this table are robust to specifications of the STAR model, such as ESTAR versus LSTAR and different
values of d, and using information criteria.
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Table 1.3: P-value of likelihood ratio tests
Country Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland
ST-ICM v.s. ICM {0.72} {0.82} {1.00} {0.68} {0.01} {0.29}
ST-ICM v.s. STAR {0.01} {0.19} {0.00} {0.12} {0.04} {0.00}
Country France Germany Italy Japan Netherlands New Zealand
ST-ICM v.s. ICM {0.25} {0.72} {0.00} {0.07} {0.13} {0.40}
ST-ICM v.s. STAR {0.00} {0.01} {0.00} {0.00} {0.01} {0.01}
Country Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland the UK
ST-ICM v.s. ICM {0.01} {0.50} {1.00} {0.01} {0.25} {1.00}
ST-ICM v.s. STAR {0.02} {0.00} {0.05} {0.00} {0.01} {0.00}
Figure 1.2: Autocorrelation function
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Figure 1.3: Half-lives
1.6 Revisiting the PPP puzzle
In this section, we study the PPP puzzle by investigating mean-reverting properties of the estimated
models. For this purpose, it is useful to consider two extra models: an AR model and a partial adjustment
model (PA). The AR model contains both constant real exchange rate equilibrium and a constant
mean-reversion speed. It is commonly used in the DSGE literature to measure persistence of real exchange
rates. The PA model allows time-varying equilibrium but keeps the mean-reversion speed constant. Put
in another way, the PA model is the ICM model with βicm = 0 or the STAR model with θ = 0.
To maintain comparability with the literature, we calculate half-lives implied in each model. Figure
1.3 reports half-lives for all 18 countries. A half-live is defined as the number of periods for half of a
shock to die out; hence, it can be used to measure the mean-reversion speed.15 The AR model implies
half-lives ranging from 2-6 years, which is consistent with the literature (Taylor and Taylor, 2004). By
allowing time-varying equilibrium, the PA model reduces the half-lives in most countries. However, the
half-lives are still too big to resolve the puzzle. The ICM model implies much shorter half-lives with an
average equal to 1.5 years. Notably, the half-live of Spain-US real exchange rate in the ICM model is
much smaller than in all other models. At last, in the STAR model, half-lives depends on shock sizes. In
figure 1.3, we consider a very large shock that drives the real exchange rate 40% away from its equilibrium
so that the average half-live equals 1.5 years, same as in the ICM model. However, as such big shocks
would be very rare, the estimated STAR model still indicate very persistent real exchange rates.
Half-lives provide very limited information. To obtain full information of mean-reversion processes,
we look at the entire impulse response function. In panel A of figure 1.4, we plot a impulse response
15We calculate half-lives by impulse responses. For a nonlinear model like the STAR model, we need to use the Generalized
Impulse Response Function (GIRF) according to Koop et al. (1996):
GIRFh(h, φ, ωt−1) = E(yt+h | ut = φ, ωt−1)− E(yt+h | ut = 0, ωt−1)
where h = 1, 2, . . ., denotes horizon, ut is a shock that occurs at time t, and ωt−1 is the history of a time series. GIRFh is a
random variable and its analytic expression is generally not available for h > 1. To calculate the GIRF numerically, we
conduct two Monte Carlo forecasts for 200 periods ahead using the estimated STAR model. The first has a shock occurring
in the first period and the second does not. Both forecasts condition on q0 = qEQ0 . The difference between the two forecasts
gives the GIRF .
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Figure 1.4: ICM dynamics of the UK-US real exchange rate
function of the ICM model estimated using the UK data, which looks similar to the ACF reported
in figure 1.2. This non-monotonic impulse response function states that a half-life only measures the
short-term persistence. Likewise, measuring persistence by the first few orders of autocorrelation, as do
many papers in the literature, gives misleading results. Clearly, the impulse response function suggests
that real exchange rates are persistent only in the long run due to oscillation around the equilibrium. This
oscillation explains a large proportion of the real exchange rate volatility at low frequencies. Therefore,
our ICM model answers Rogoff’s question by distinguishing between different degrees of persistence in
the short-run and the long-run. In addition, the ICM model features a mean-reversion speed reaching its
maximum when the real exchange rate passes through the equilibrium. By contrast, the STAR model
features a slow mean-reversion speed in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium. To see how this difference
matters, we compare in-sample forecasts of the ICM and the STAR. Forecasts of the UK-US real exchange
rate is plotted in panel B of figure 1.4. The forecasts are made conditional on 1980Q3. The special ICM
dynamics match the large depreciation data in the mid 1980s.
1.7 Forecasting performance
In-sample fitness does not necessarily correlate with out-of-sample predictability. We now formally test
predictability of real exchange rate based on the ICM and the STAR model separately. There are large
variances in the literature regarding forecast evaluation methods, on which the conclusion depends a lot
(Rossi, 2013). Here I choose a random walk without a drift as our benchmark model because beating
the random walk forecasts can be interpreted as exchange rate predictability, and adding a drift worsen
the results (Engel et al., 2007). We consider forecast horizons from 1 to 12 quarters, covering those
typically considered in the literature. We estimate the models and calculate forecast error using rolling
windows. The first window runs from 1973Q2 to 2003Q1-h where h denotes the forecast horizon, then we
make h-step forecasts for 2003Q1. We treat out-of-sample real exchange rate equilibrium equal to the
last in-sample observation. For the nonlinear STAR model, forecasts are based on 1000 Monte Carlo
simulation. The second window runs from 1973Q3 to 2003Q2-h, then the third window etc. The number
of forecasts f = 44 at each horizon is constant. Given our 163 observations, the out-of-sample portion
accounts roughly one third of the full sample. We find our results generally robust to other partitions.
After rolling window forecasting, the mean squared forecast error (MSFE) of a given horizon is
calculated as MSFEm = 1f
∑2013Q4−h
t=2003Q1−h
(
ϵt+h|t
)2 where m denotes a model, i.e., ICM, STAR, or random
walk. There are many ways to compare forecasting performance. Following the suggestion of Rogoff and
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Stavrakeva (2008), we employ Theil’s U-statistic, UICM = MSFEICMMSFERW and USTAR =
MSFESTAR
MSFERW
. If the U
statistics is smaller than 1, it indicates real exchange rate predictability based on the ICM or the STAR
model. Significance of the predictability can be tested against the null hypothesis of Um ≥ 1 by bootstrap.
According to Rogoff and Stavrakeva (2008), this test is more powerful and better sized than popular
alternatives. The U-statistics and their P-values are reported in table 1.4. We use “+” to indicate a
U-statistic smaller than 1, in which occasions P-values are reported in braces. We use “*” to indicate
statistical significance at 10%.
The ICM beats random walk forecasts in only 4 countries, namely, Canada, Denmark, Italy, and
Norway. However, in most of these cases, the predictability is significant. The ICM tend to provide
better forecasts at longer horizons, except Canada showing the opposite. In fact, the forecast gain of the
ICM at long horizons is quite strong with lowest U-statistic being 0.29 (Italy, 12 quarters ahead). The
STAR beats random walk forecasts in 17 countries, and significantly in 10 countries.The forecast gain
varies across horizons and countries. The forecast accuracy is better at shorter horizons in France and
Netherlands, while the opposite holds true in Germany, Japan, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. In Denmark,
Norway, and Switzerland, the forecast gain is larger at medium horizons. We also find that time-varying
real exchange rate equilibrium helps forecast. If assuming constant equilibrium, the number of cases in
which the ICM or the STAR beats random walk forecasts drops by about a quarter.
At last, we note that the two models seem complementary to each other. When the ICM shows
significant forecast gain, the STAR does not, and vice versa. However, there are cases in which neither
models perform well, e.g., Belgium.
1.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we model real exchange rates between the US and 18 OECD countries by an innovative
dynamic process called ICM and time-varying equilibrium. We use the popular STAR model as a
benchmark. After estimating the models, we find evidence of integral correction mechanism and smooth
transition nonlinearity in data. We further establish that the ICM fits in-sample data both statistically
and economically better than the STAR model. Superiority of the ICM originates from its ability to
capture ACFs of real exchange rates. The ICM model implies that real exchange rates revert to their
equilibrium very quickly in the short-run, but moves back and forth around the equilibrium in the long-run.
By distinguishing the degree of persistence at different horizons, the ICM model helps us understand the
PPP puzzle. At last, we evaluate out-of-sample performance of both models. The ICM beats random
walk forecasts for only 4 out of 18 real exchange rates. However, when it does, the ICM can predict real
exchange rate well at both short and long horizons. Real exchange rate predictability, though not always
significant, is found for 17 real exchange rates using the STAR model.
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Table 1.4: Out-of-sample performance
Horizon UICM USTAR UICM USTAR UICM USTAR
Austrialia Austria Belgium
1 1.847 0.994{0.220}+ 1.111 0.988{0.129}+ 2.362 1.053
2 2.401 0.976{0.234}+ 1.195 1.023 3.399 1.045
3 2.993 0.956{0.203}+ 1.297 0.989{0.177}+ 4.51 1.05
4 3.799 0.943{0.204}+ 1.339 0.984{0.146}+ 5.254 1.096
5 4.641 1.039 1.431 0.984{0.160}+ 6.208 1.11
6 5.199 1.038 1.398 0.991{0.232}+ 7.016 1.128
7 5.441 1.058 1.254 0.992{0.214}+ 6.61 1.581
8 1.396 Inf 1.145 1.006 6.326 1.495
9 5.623 1.06 1.126 1.025 6.336 1.437
10 5.76 1.043 1.215 0.983{0.183}+ 6.321 1.399
11 5.911 1.037 1.128 1.001 6.423 1.507
12 5.837 1.008 1.082 1.015 6.475 1.531
Canada Denmark Finland
1 0.954{0.036}+* 1.029 0.958{0.037}+* 0.983{0.116}+ 1.083 0.955{0.042}+*
2 0.937{0.069}+* 1.012 0.897{0.036}+* 1.009 1.13 0.957{0.101}+
3 0.912{0.049}+* 0.981{0.196}+ 0.837{0.021}+* 0.979{0.138}+ 1.219 0.926{0.096}+*
4 0.937{0.090}+* 0.979{0.239}+ 0.770{0.016}+* 0.755{0.012}+* 1.24 0.950{0.173}+
5 0.993{0.135}+ 0.981{0.223}+ 0.704{0.016}+* 0.794{0.032}+* 1.298 0.942{0.135}+
6 1.06 0.974{0.227}+ 0.643{0.025}+* 0.878{0.089}+* 1.363 0.972{0.252}+
7 1.125 0.996{0.334}+ 0.619{0.017}+* 0.877{0.099}+* 1.331 0.939{0.184}+
8 1.182 1.008 0.584{0.016}+* 0.853{0.101}+ 1.298 0.953{0.221}+
9 1.204 0.994{0.332}+ 0.542{0.012}+* 0.860{0.109}+ 1.308 0.941{0.214}+
10 1.193 0.991{0.315}+ 0.490{0.015}+* 0.883{0.127}+ 1.296 0.900{0.196}+
11 1.138 1 0.457{0.015}+* 0.895{0.154}+ 1.324 0.924{0.229}+
12 1.131 1.002 0.418{0.010}+* 0.918{0.172}+ 1.368 0.905{0.203}+
France Germany Italy
1 1.344 0.915{0.010}+* 2.225 0.864{0.000}+* 0.953{0.027}+* 1.004
2 1.566 0.923{0.060}+* 3.003 0.816{0.006}+* 0.868{0.014}+* 0.999{0.293}+
3 1.798 0.821{0.017}+* 3.685 0.779{0.008}+* 0.801{0.018}+* 0.988{0.227}+
4 1.857 0.824{0.038}+* 4.031 0.827{0.044}+* 0.691{0.008}+* 0.998{0.283}+
5 1.96 0.872{0.093}+* 4.492 0.858{0.061}+* 0.572{0.005}+* 1.003
6 2.024 0.924{0.144}+ 4.788 0.778{0.044}+* 0.482{0.002}+* 1.009
7 1.86 0.914{0.155}+ 4.458 0.749{0.043}+* 0.434{0.004}+* 1.004
8 1.773 0.898{0.162}+ 4.289 0.713{0.029}+* 0.406{0.002}+* 1.006
9 1.744 0.911{0.181}+ 4.257 0.708{0.037}+* 0.385{0.004}+* 0.954{0.229}+
10 1.699 0.899{0.208}+ 4.261 0.732{0.078}+* 0.358{0.002}+* 0.939{0.224}+
11 1.683 0.939{0.230}+ 4.38 0.729{0.074}+* 0.329{0.005}+* 1.054
12 1.672 0.989{0.327}+ 4.485 0.732{0.088}+* 0.290{0.003}+* 1.001
Note: “+” indicates a U-statistic smaller than 1, “*” indicates statistical significance at 10%, P-values
are reported in braces.
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Table 4: Out-of-sample performance (continue)
Horizon UICM USTAR UICM USTAR UICM USTAR
Japan Netherlands New Zealand
1 3.315 0.989{0.171}+ 1.272 0.998{0.276}+ 1.221 1.014
2 5.847 0.981{0.157}+ 1.448 0.989{0.219}+ 1.287 0.974{0.168}+
3 7.338 0.940{0.101}+ 1.591 0.979{0.180}+ 1.359 0.965{0.124}+
4 8.615 0.858{0.057}+* 1.619 1.028 1.412 0.946{0.137}+
5 9.572 0.792{0.045}+* 1.706 1.098 1.439 0.922{0.120}+
6 9.586 0.776{0.050}+* 1.797 1.12 1.46 1.169
7 9.809 0.745{0.044}+* 1.756 1.118 1.463 1.09
8 10.383 0.716{0.046}+* 1.754 1.09 1.459 1.194
9 11.072 0.670{0.042}+* 1.785 1.065 1.468 1.198
10 11.64 0.678{0.046}+* 1.79 1.068 1.463 1.273
11 11.882 0.651{0.033}+* 1.846 1.156 1.448 1.301
12 12.186 0.638{0.052}+* 1.931 1.172 1.388 1.305
Norway Portugal Spain
1 0.994{0.113}+ 1.128 1.16 1.01 2.972 0.937{0.027}+*
2 0.985{0.118}+ 1.045 1.223 0.992{0.158}+ 4.621 0.802{0.005}+*
3 0.987{0.117}+ 0.766{0.005}+* 1.323 1.012 6.402 0.754{0.005}+*
4 0.960{0.095}+* 0.709{0.003}+* 5.11 0.993{0.221}+ 7.689 0.783{0.023}+*
5 0.937{0.093}+* 0.736{0.010}+* 1.526 0.993{0.209}+ 8.95 0.717{0.008}+*
6 0.915{0.097}+* 0.922{0.153}+ 6.594 0.999{0.393}+ 9.953 0.709{0.020}+*
7 0.882{0.086}+* 0.965{0.215}+ 1.53 1.015 9.533 0.677{0.017}+*
8 0.860{0.079}+* 1.043 1.527 0.997{0.317}+ 9.209 0.711{0.039}+*
9 0.839{0.096}+* 1.034 1.92 1 9.273 0.627{0.018}+*
10 0.791{0.086}+* 0.982{0.272}+ 1.886 1 9.181 0.595{0.018}+*
11 0.760{0.062}+* 1.122 7.2 0.986{0.130}+ 9.117 0.595{0.021}+*
12 0.720{0.067}+* 1.239 7.528 0.995{0.290}+ 9.057 0.565{0.014}+*
Sweden Switzerland UK
1 1.779 0.955{0.057}+* 2.244 1.075 1.239 0.947{0.024}+*
2 2.235 0.852{0.011}+* 3.479 0.964{0.153}+ 1.329 0.872{0.018}+*
3 3.145 0.838{0.033}+* 4.929 0.969{0.212}+ 1.44 0.842{0.026}+*
4 4.125 0.802{0.040}+* 5.241 0.867{0.065}+* 1.435 0.819{0.038}+*
5 5.266 0.786{0.048}+* 6.184 0.903{0.168}+ 1.415 0.813{0.059}+*
6 6.044 0.803{0.080}+* 6.854 0.902{0.178}+ 1.352 0.797{0.074}+*
7 6.167 0.798{0.086}+* 6.437 0.885{0.191}+ 1.263 0.780{0.056}+*
8 6.193 0.761{0.069}+* 6.357 0.907{0.234}+ 1.224 0.760{0.060}+*
9 6.256 0.746{0.077}+* 6.318 0.844{0.176}+ 1.192 0.746{0.060}+*
10 7.166 0.742{0.090}+* 6.475 1.038 1.159 0.745{0.079}+*
11 7.971 0.798{0.145}+ 6.564 1.107 1.132 0.758{0.070}+*
12 8.892 0.824{0.203}+ 6.534 1.109 1.073 0.767{0.115}+
Note: “+” indicates a U-statistic smaller than 1, “*” indicates statistical significance at 10%, P-values
are reported in braces.
Appendix A
A.1 Estimation results of STAR
Table A: Estimation Results of STAR
Country Australia Austria Belgium
Specification ESTAR (1,1) LSTAR (1,3) LSTAR (1,7)
a0 -0.21 {0.16} -2.59 {0.00} -3.45 {0.00}
a1 -0.21 {0.63} -0.40 {0.51} 0.11 {0.83}
a2 0.21 {0.17} 1.20 {0.01} 3.11 {0.001}
a3 -2.00 {0.002} -1.26 {0.11} -2.31 {0.04}
βecm = −βecm∗ 1 (fixed) 1 (fixed)
θ -0.40 (-0.42) {0.33} -1.18 (-0.17) {0.19} 0.48 (0.09) {0.40}
βecm∗ -0.98 (-14.06) -0.18 (-1.31) -0.15 (-2.11)
σstar 0.05 0.07 0.06
R2 0.92 0.85 0.91
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.37} {0.87} {0.58}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.75} {0.94} {0.44}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.78} {0.95} {0.70}
Throughout Section A.1 and Section A.2:
Numbers in () and {} are t-statistics and P-value, respectively.
Diagnostic: AR(1), ARCH(1), nonlinearities are Lagrange Multiplier tests to neglect autocorrelation,
heteroscedasticity and nonlinearity, respectively.
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Table A continued: Estimation Results of STAR
Country Canada Denmark Finland
Specification LSTAR (1,5) LSTAR (1,1) LSTAR (1,8)
a0 -0.09 {0.05} -2.36 {0.001} -1.43 {0.00}
a1 -0.34 {0.13} 0.38 {0.35} 0.10 {0.75}
a2 0.98 {0.00} 0.72 {0.05} 0.12 {0.54}
a3 -0.90 {0.00} -1.24 {0.02} -0.34 {0.17}
βecm 1 (fixed) 0.97 (31.98) 0.95 (3.06)
θ 4.55 (1.55) {0.12} -12.70 (-2.06) {0.02} -31.16 (-0.43) {0.33}
βecm∗ -0.13 (-1.92) -0.51 (-2.05) -0.03 (-0.49)
σstar 0.03 0.06 0.05
R2 0.95 0.878 0.88
Diagnostic: AR(1) {1.00} {0.44} {0.76}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {1.00} {0.16} {0.98}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {1.00} {0.95} {0.99}
Table A continued: Estimation Results of STAR
Country France Germany Italy
Specification LSTAR (1,4) LSTAR (1,4) LSTAR (1,2)
a0 -1.75 {0.00} -0.58 {0.002} -7.51 {0.00}
a1 -0.28 {0.47} -0.34 {0.29} -0.36 {0.09}
a2 0.45 {0.17} 0.59 {0.03} 0.78 {0.00}
a3 -0.34 {0.73} 1.28 {0.06} -0.05 {0.93}
βecm 0.96 (28.11) 0.95 (15.58) 0.97 (2.29)
θ -45.71 (-0.72) {0.23} 6.20 (0.25) {0.40} -19.58 (-1.67) {0.05}
βecm∗ -0.16 (-1.72) -0.02 (-0.16) -0.37 (-1.90)
σstar 0.06 0.06 0.05
R2 0.88 0.88 0.90
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.37} {0.91} {0.94}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.68} {0.43} {0.92}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.62} {0.39} {1.00}
Table A continued: Estimation Results of STAR
Country Japan Netherlands New Zealand
Specification LSTAR (1,5) LSTAR (1,4) LSTAR (1,7)
a0 -5.14 {0.001} -0.32 {0.04} -0.57 {0.00}
a1 0.13 {0.69} 0.13 {0.73} -0.17 {0.42}
a2 0.58 {0.00} 1.38 {0.001} 0.39 {0.04}
a3 -1.68 {0.09} -1.84 {0.00} -0.71 {0.01}
βecm 1 (fixed) 1 (fixed) 1 (fixed)
θ -1.65 (-1.31) {0.15} -18.38 (-1.08) {0.16} 3.80 (0.87) {0.12}
βecm∗ -0.19 ( -2.51) -0.28 (-1.92) -0.11 ( -1.75)
σstar 0.05 0.06 0.06
R2 0.93 0.89 0.91
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.83} {1.00} {1.00}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.75} {1.00} {1.00}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.98} {1.00} {1.00}
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Table A continued: Estimation Results of STAR
Country Norway Portugal Spain
Specification LSTAR (1,2) LSTAR (1,2) ESTAR (1,1)
a0 -0.67 {0.39} -3.45 {0.00} -5.99 {0.00}
a1 -0.43 {0.17} 1.17 {0.01} 0.02 {0.96}
a2 0.15 {0.01} 0.06 {0.88} 0.22 {0.14}
a3 -0.70 {0.002} 4.73 {0.00} -0.44 {0.35}
βecm 0.96 (3.44) 1 (fixed) = −βecm∗
θ -26.42 (-1.02) {0.15} -2.60 (-1.14) {0.19} -0.03 (-0.91) {0.18}
βecm∗ -0.41 (-1.96) -0.15 (-1.92) -1.04 (-59.21)
σstar 0.06 0.07 0.05
R2 0.84 0.95 0.97
Diagnostic: AR(1) {1.00} {0.76} {0.84}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.72} {0.61} {0.80}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {1.00} {0.18} {0.81}
Table A continued: Estimation Results of STAR
Country Sweden Switzerland the UK
Specification ESTAR (1,1) ESTAR (1,1) LSTAR (1,8)
a0 -1.24 {0.25} -0.03 {0.93} 0.53 {0.05}
a1 -0.36 {0.50} -0.25 {0.70} -0.01 {0.98}
a2 0.87 {0.01} 1.01 {0.08} 0.08 {0.75}
a3 -2.72 {0.00} -0.63 {0.33} 0.80 {0.14}
βecm = −βecm∗ = −βecm∗ 1 (fixed)
θ -2.95 (-2.81) {0.003} -1.66 (-2.08) {0.02} -8.46 (-0.92) {0.14}
βecm∗ -1.08 (-20.74) -1.03 (-10.38) -0.16 (-2.36)
σstar 0.06 0.06 0.05
R2 0.91 0.87 0.83
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.08} {0.98} {0.01}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.38} {0.51} {0.97}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.78} {0.81} {0.40}
A.2 Estimation results of ICM
Table B: Estimation Results of ICM
Country Australia Austria Belgium
a0 0.34 {0.36} -2.84 {0.00} -3.06 {0.00}
a1 -0.21 {0.64} -0.41 {0.48} -0.15 {0.76}
a2 0.20 {0.19} 1.16 {0.01} 1.50 {0.11}
a3 -1.93 {0.002} -1.41 {0.06} -0.85 {0.39}
βecm 0.94 (28.82) 0.89 (22.72) 0.94 (33.62)
βicm -0.006 (-2.75) {0.06} -0.002 (-0.55) {0.72} -0.011 (-3.54) {0.006}
R2 0.92 0.85 0.91
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.72} {0.57} {0.95}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.66} {0.71} {0.32}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.36} {0.12} {0.90}
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Table B continued: Estimation Results of ICM
Country Canada Denmark Finland
a0 0.28 {0.009} -1.84 {0.02} -1.44 {0.00}
a1 -0.41 {0.19} -0.03 {0.95} 0.06 {0.83}
a2 0.96 {0.00} 1.22 {0.002} 0.15 {0.41}
a3 -0.88 {0.009} -1.32 {0.07} -0.15 {0.09}
βecm 0.92 (30.19) 0.91 (25.85) 0.94 (33.69)
βicm -0.002 (-1.97) {0.27} -0.012 (-2.79) {0.06} -0.010 (-3.40) {0.008}
R2 0.95 0.88 0.89
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.61} {0.08} {0.49}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.96} {0.52} {0.74}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.18} {0.01} {0.51}
Table B continued: Estimation Results of ICM
Country France Germany Italy
a0 -1.52 {0.00} -0.05 {0.86} -7.93 {0.00}
a1 -0.41 {0.12} -0.42 {0.20} -0.62 {0.009}
a2 0.40 {0.25} 0.38 {0.27} 0.66 {0.002}
a3 -0.56 {0.59} 0.82 {0.19} 0.09 {0.88}
βecm 0.93 (31.23) 0.92 (28.73) 0.93 (30.23)
βicm -0.013 (-3.86) {0.003} -0.008 (-1.937) {0.28} -0.011 (-3.33) {0.01}
R2 0.88 0.89 0.91
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.59} {0.72} {0.54}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.58} {0.78} {0.86}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.22} {0.31} {0.01}
Table B continued: Estimation Results of ICM
Country Japan Netherlands New Zealand
a0 -5.81 {0.00} -0.68 {0.01} -0.71 {0.06}
a1 0.13 {0.64} -0.07 {0.86} -0.31 {0.13}
a2 0.62 {0.00} 1.22 {0.002} 0.54 {0.004}
a3 -1.85 {0.06} -1.40 {0.003} -0.67 {0.02}
βecm 0.86 (21.05) 0.95 (33.71) 0.95 (27.51)
βicm -0.006 (-2.77) {0.06} -0.009 (-2.76) {0.06} -0.012 (-2.80) {0.06}
R2 0.94 0.89 0.92
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.15} {0.50} {0.54}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.61} {0.97} {0.38}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.77} {0.26} {0.87}
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Table B continued: Estimation Results of ICM
Country Norway Portugal Spain
a0 -1.93 {0.02} -2.41 {0.002} -5.72 {0.00}
a1 -0.02 {0.95} 1.12 {0.02} 0.02 {0.96}
a2 0.23 {0.007} 1.04 {0.00} 0.29 {0.06}
a3 -0.62 {0.007} 4.98 {0.00} -0.67 {0.20}
βecm 0.91 (25.63) 0.94 (35.25) 0.93 (37.71)
βicm -0.011 (-2.76) {0.06} -0.012 (-4.49) {0.00} -0.003 (-1.91) {0.29}
R2 0.84 0.95 0.97
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.31} {0.38} {0.23}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.60} {0.48} {0.69}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.03} {0.69} {0.86}
Table B continued: Estimation Results of ICM
Country Sweden Switzerland the UK
a0 -1.62 {0.11} 0.14 {0.68} 0.48 {0.13}
a1 -0.07 {0.86} 0.002 {0.99} 0.01 {0.97}
a2 0.63 {0.007} 1.07 {0.01} 0.03 {0.89}
a3 -2.33 {0.00} -0.21 {0.72} 0.69 {0.15}
βecm 0.92 (28.90) 0.91 (25.41) 0.92 (29.28)
βicm -0.013 (-3.28) {0.01} -0.013 (-2.70) {0.07} -0.03 (-5.00) {0.00}
R2 0.91 0.88 0.85
Diagnostic: AR(1) {0.63} {0.24} {0.31}
Diagnostic: ARCH(1) {0.63} {0.90} {0.42}
Diagnostic: nonlinearity {0.26} {0.44} {0.56}
A.3 Data source
We mainly collect CPI and nominal exchange rate data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database, except Germany’s CPI available at the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators database.
The bilateral nominal exchange rates between Euro area countries and the US are converted from the
Euro/USD exchange rate by the official Euro conversion rates.
Data on real GDP does primarily come from the OECD’s Outlook database (OECD code: GDPV)
except for Germany, data for which comes from the IFS database (calculated by GDP and GDP deflator,
IFS code: 13499B.CZF, 13499BIRZF). The IFS data is in billion Deutsche mark at the quarterly level and
was converted to million Euro at the annual level, in line with OECD data. Annual data on population is
from IFS (IFS code: 99Z—ZF).
Data on the terms of trade is from OECD’s Outlook database (OECD code: TTRADE) and is
calculated by the ratio between the export deflator and the import deflator of goods and services (OECD
code: PXGS, PMGS). The exceptions are Austria and Germany, for which the data is collected from
IFS’s import and export price index (IFS code: 76-ZF, 76-X-ZF).
Data on the trade balance for all countries is also from OECD’s Outlook database (OECD code:
FBGSD), defined as net exports of goods and services.
In the OECD databases, data for the Euro area countries is now expressed in Euro, so pre-1999 data
was converted from the national currency using official euro conversion rates. Thus, “national currency"
always refers to the Euro for the Euro area countries. IFS data on the terms of trade and the CPI is not
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seasonally adjusted at the source and was therefore harmonized with the X11 procedure, which is the
standard method of seasonal adjustment for many statistical agencies.
A.4 Regression with parameterized ACF
This appendix presents the quasi maximum likelihood estimation procedure in the estimation of equations
1.8 and 1.9, which are repeated here:
ρτ =
1− a [1− cos (ωτ)]
1 + bτ c ,
qt = a0 + a1 ln rgdpt + a2 ln tott + a3tbt + errt.
We rewrite the second equation as
q = qEQ + err,
where q ≡ (q1, . . . , qT ), qEQ ≡ (a0 + a1 ln rgdp1 + a2 ln tot1 + a3tb1, . . . , a0 + a1 ln rgdpT + a2 ln totT +
a3tbT ) = βX, and err ∼ (0,Σ) are (1× T ) vectors. Assuming errt mean-reversion, the autocorrelation
matrix of err has a symmetric Toeplitz structure
R ≡
ρ0 · · · ρT−1
... . . .
...
ρT−1 · · · ρ0
where ρτ ≡ cov(errt, errt−τ )/
√
(var(errt)var(errt−τ ). If errt follows an AR(1) process, we have ρτ = ρτ
and one parameter, ρ, to estimate. Given equation 1.8, there are four parameters in the ACF to estimate.
To estimate parameters in qEQ and Σ, we note that Σ is proportional to R and applying Cholesky
decomposition gives Σ = σ2LL′. L−1 is a lower triangular matrix that removes autocorrelation from u
and takes the form L−1 ≡ A 0−α′ 1 where α
′ ≡ (αT−1, . . . , α2, α1) and A is a T − 1 dimension lower-
triangular block matrix. Pre-multiplying equation 1.9 by L−1 gives L−1q = L−1qEQ + ε, ε ∼ D(0, σ2IT ).
The transformed residual ε is free of autocorrelation. This transformed model has several implications:
1. The transformed residual, ε, is effectively a linear projection of the original residual. Hence, the
last row of L−1 has an interpretation as coefficients in an AR(T-1) representation of εT by which
we can calculate the impulse response function. This interpretation is also justified by Cramer’s
Decomposition. It states that any non-explosive process, whether nonlinear and/or nonstationary,
can be represented by an invertible MA with time-varying coefficients, which explains the time-
varying AR representations implied by the last rows of L−1. The ESTAR model also allows a
time-varying AR coefficient but the order of AR is very limited. Hence, its power to capture the
dynamic is limited.
2. Since qEQ is exogenous and L−1 is a lower triangular matrix, L−1qEQ is a linear combination of
only current and past values. Hence, it is also exogenous.
3. The constant in qEQ, after transformation by L−1, is no longer a constant vector. We assumed that
the data has been de-meaned before being transformed. Having a nonzero sample mean in the data
would have introduced a common factor of a transformed constant vector in all these transformed
variables, which may dominate these series and produce some seemingly common factor that causes
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multicollinearity and other unnecessary numerical instabilities. If a constant is required in the
regression, it should be transformed separately and then added to the transformed regression. The
theorem of Frisch and Waugh (1933) proves that the resulting point estimates would be identical
with or without removing the mean.
The log maximum likelihood function of the model is
−T2 log (2π)−
T
2 log |Σ| −
T
2
(
q − qEQ)′Σ−1 (q − qEQ) .
The maximum likelihood estimators are
βˆ = (X ′A′AX)−1X ′A′Aq,
σˆ2 = 1
T
(
q −Xβˆ
)′
(LL′)−1
(
q −Xβˆ
)
.
And the estimators of the ACF’s parameters are obtained by numerically maximizing
−log
∣∣∣∣(q −Xβˆ)′R−1 (q −Xβˆ)R∣∣∣∣+ T log (T )− T.
Chapter 2
Can DSGE Models Explain Real
Exchange Rate Facts at All
Frequencies?
2.1 Introduction
Movement of real exchange rates has been an important topic in international economics. One of the
reasons is that, for example, monetary and exchange rate policy should correct the misalignment in
international relative prices, e.g., real exchange rates. Real exchange rates are expected to be stationary
time series according to the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) hypothesis, which states that, once converted
into a common currency, two countries should have the same price level in the long run. In the short
run, real exchange rates are generally not constant. In particular, real exchange rates have been found to
exhibit long memory as evidenced by either half-lives (about 2-5 years) or first-order autocorrelation1
(roughly 0.91-0.97 for quarterly data), and high volatility (three times more volatile than GDP).
A question is asked by Rogoff (1996): If we take that liquidity shocks drive the high volatility of real
exchange rates, then the real exchange rates would be expected not to be very persistent. This problem is
known as the PPP puzzle. There are two strands of literature addressing the puzzle from different angles.
First, theoretical work employs dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models to generate highly
volatile and/or persistent real exchange rates (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan, 2002; Corsetti, Dedola, and
Leduc, 2008; Rabanal, Rubio-Ramirez, and Tuesta, 2011; Rabanal and Tuesta, 2013; Steinsson, 2008,
among others). These models typically focus on business cycle (BC) frequencies, targeting statistics
after applying a H-P filter or other detrending methods on data. Another strand of literature employs
reduced-form empirical models in which real exchange rates are governed by nonlinear dynamics. This
literature argues that the standard measures of persistence, e.g. the first-order autocorrelation, implicitly
assume linearity and are subject to bias. One of the most popular nonlinear dynamics called smooth
transition (ST) autoregression features slower mean reversion when real exchange rates are closer to their
long-term equilibrium level. Taylor, Peel, and Sarno (2001), Paya and Peel (2006) and Lothian and Taylor
(2008) among many others compare ST autoregression models with the standard linear autoregression
models and find evidence in favour of the former. They also find shorter half-lives implied by the ST
autoregression.
1The partial autocorrelation typically suggests that the real exchange rate is a first-order process so only the first-order
autocorrelation is typically employed.
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So far, these two strands of literature are to a large extent isolated. DSGE models are routinely
calibrated to match standard statistics and ignore the shorter half-lives and nonlinear dynamics discovered
in the recent empirical literature. Additionally, DSGE models are typically designed to capture real
exchange rate at business cycle frequencies while empirical models use un-filtered data, i.e., capturing
real exchange rate all all frequencies. This chapter makes two contributions to the literature. First, I
bridge these two distinct strands of literature above by studying time-series properties of real exchange
rates generated by DSGE models. In doing so, I employ the DSGE model studied by Rabanal and
Rubio-Ramirez (2015) which can capture real exchange rates at all frequencies by fitting their spectrum.
This is important because a spectral analysis indicates that business cycle frequencies only account for
about 25% of real exchange rates variance, and about 70% of the variance are assigned to frequencies
lower than business cycle frequencies. Therefore, the literature of business cycle models misses a large
part of the story. Furthermore Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015) argue that conventional DSGE models,
by focusing on business cycle frequencies, assign too little real exchange rate variance to frequencies lower
than the business cycle frequencies when the model is calibrated to un-filtered data. This is referred to as
“excess persistence of the RER” puzzle. My choice of Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015)’s international
real business cycle (IRBC) model is also justified by Gehrke and Yao (2017). They use a structural vector
autoregression model and decompose real exchange rate variance across both shocks and frequencies.
They find supply shocks to be the main driver of real exchange rates at low frequencies. Given the
DSGE model, I investigate if it can generate the integral correction mechanism (ICM) studied in chapter
1. Chapter 1 suggests that the ICM is a better representation of real exchange rates than the popular
ST autoregression model because the ST autoregression model also exhibits the “excess persistence”
problem.2 The second contribution of this chapter is to give structural interpretations to the ICM and
the PPP puzzle, using the DSGE model. In doing so, I also make comments on the micro-foundation
of the key feature, i.e. a input adjustment cost, of Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015)’s model. The
input adjustment cost depends on changes in the ratio between domestic and imported goods. It makes
imported good less responsive to it price and hence makes the trade elasticity time-varying.
Specifically, I examine if the DSGE model can generate several features of real exchange rates at all
frequencies, which are robust across pairs of countries. These features include the standard deviation, the
autocorrelation function (ACF), the spectrum and the ICM. The findings are threefold. First, I find that
the model employed by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015) overfits the spectrum in the sense that it
misses other features of the real exchange rate. A minor modification fixes this problem so that the model
captures all features of the real exchange rate fairly well. However, the final calibration requires a input
adjustment cost that is larger than that suggested by micro evidence. Second, I study impulse response
functions in the DSGE model by varying the size of the input adjustment cost. The size of the input
adjustment cost makes nonmonotone impacts on model dynamics. The minor modification mentioned
above turns out to make a significant difference on the impulse responses. I interpret this difference by
highlighting the inter-temporal distortion of the input adjustment cost. Third, the DSGE model provides
a structural interpretation of the ICM representation which helps us better understand the PPP puzzle.
With the final calibration, the input adjustment cost introduces a long lasting cyclical impulse response
in most of the macroeconomic variables including the real exchange rate, given a persistent positive shock
to home-country productivity. Surprisingly, I find that the initial response of the real exchange rate is
negative and reverting to its steady state quickly.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the empirical features of the
real exchange rate that a successful DSGE model should be able to explain. The next section introduces
2I do not study the smooth transition dynamics because Ahmad et al. (2013) have shown that this type of nonlinearity
can be detected in a rich, yet standard, IRBC model with nontradable goods and sticky price. And as argued by Chapter 1,
the smooth transition is unlikely to be the key feature of the real exchange rate.
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Figure 2.1: Spectrum and ACF of U.S. real exchange rate
Notes:
1. The gray area in panel A represents BC frequencies, defined from 8 to 32 quarters. Frequencies lower
than BC will be referred to as low frequencies.
2. The dotted lines represent 90% confidence intervals.
the IRBC model. In Section 2.4, I investigate whether the IRBC model is able to generate the empirical
features of the real exchange rate. Section 2.5 gives an intuition about how the new mechanism in the
IRBC model brings it closer to data. Section 2.6 discusses the quantitative performance of this model on
other dimensions. The last section concludes the chapter.
2.2 Data features
This section describes the source of the data and reports features of the real exchange rate from different
aspects. I study the quarterly U.S. effective data. The real exchange rate is collected from the federal
reserve board’s major index. This index is a weighted average of the foreign exchange values of the U.S.
dollar against the currencies circulated widely outside the issuing country, including the Euro, the Canada
dollar, the Japanese yen, the British pound, the Swiss franc, the Australian dollar and the Swedish krona.
These seven countries are referred to as the rest of world (R.W.). The U.S. is treated as the home country
and the R.W. is treated as the foreign country. The rest of the data is collected from the U.S. Bureau of
Economic Analysis, except the Solow Residual taken from Rabanal et al. (2011). The data spans from
1973q2 to 2006q4 during which period the estimate of the Solow Residual is available.
The real exchange rate is known to be highly volatile and persistent. The standard deviation of the
sample is about 0.1095. As shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 2.1 on page 29, about 75% of the
variance are at a low frequency. The standard deviation at BC frequencies3 is 0.051, or 3.3 times that
of GDP. The degree of persistence is usually summarized by the first-order autocorrelation, which is
about 0.95. Standard tests for the unit root such as Augmented Dickey-Fuller cannot reject the unit root.
Chapter 1 suggest that not only the first-order autocorrelation but the autocorrelation function (ACF)
are investigated, which is natural because the autocorrelation function corresponds to the spectrum one
by one. As shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 2.1 on page 29, the ACF goes down very fast4 to a
negative level and cyclically moves around zero with a decaying magnitude. The ACF suggests that the
real exchange rate is persistent but not in a monotone way. The autocorrelations higher than order 7
are insignificant according to the 90% confidence interval. However, it may not be a good idea to take
higher order autocorrelation simply as zero because, in this case, the fast decay of ACF suggests that
3The business cycle is obtained by applying an H-P filter throughout this chapter.
4I construct two AR(1) processes for the real exchange rate by estimation, and by assigning the sample first-order
autocorrelation as the AR coefficient. Either of them implies an ACF that goes down slower than the one shown in panel B
during the first 20 periods.
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the real exchange rate is transitory. Actually, the higher-order autocorrelation drives the estimates of a
traditional reduced form model, such as an AR model or a smooth transition AR model, such that the
model implies a persistent process. The higher order autocorrelation is also important for understanding
the shape of the spectrum. The low frequencies can account for a significant proportion of the volatility
only if the real exchange rate is autocorrelated in the long run.
To study the hidden features of the real exchange rate, I estimate a time series model with an integral
correction mechanism (ICM). The general form of such a model is
errt =
p∑
j=1
βecmj errt−j + βicmiet−1 + εt, (2.1)
where the integral error (ie) is defined by
iet−1 =
t−1∑
i=0
erri, (2.2)
and errt is defined by
errt−1 = ln qt−1 − ln qEQt−1, (2.3)
with qEQ representing the “equilibrium” value of the real exchange rate (will be defined shortly), βicm ≤ 0,
and βecmj implies a stationary AR(p) process. The key parameter of this model is βicm, which determines
the emergence of the integral correction mechanism. When βicm < 0, the model features a physical
pendulum-like behaviour. Let errt be a massive bob hung by a rod, the bottom position is the equilibrium
in this model where errt = 0. Given a shock, errt will periodically move around this equilibrium position
because the term IEt can store the “momentum” until all momentum is drained by air friction. βecmj
plays the role of air friction. The trajectory of the massive bob is the impulse response of errt. To better
understand the dynamics of ICM, see 2.2 for the impulse response of the real exchange rate when the
model is estimated using U.S. data. In this model, βecmj controls the “conventional persistence”, e.g.
how fast does the real exchange rate revert to the equilibrium position. It also determines the period
of the cyclical part of the movement. βicm is analogous to the length of rope and gravity. It controls
the magnitude of the cyclical part of the movement, which is the “cyclical persistence”. I note that this
impulse response looks like that of the AR model with some negative coefficients. However, no such
estimates have been found in the literature even when the number of lags is allowed to be relatively high;
see for example Steinsson (2008).
When estimating the model, I must define the “equilibrium” value of the real exchange rate qEQ first.
Following Chapter 1 and the references therein, I define ln qEQt = a0+ a1 ln rSRt+ a2 ln tott+ a3tbt. rSR
is the Solow residual ratio between the U.S. and the R.W., capturing the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson
(HBS) effect. tb is the trade balance to output ratio and tot is the terms of trade. Finally, I select
p = 1 based on first-order partial autocorrelation. All parameters in equations 2.1 and 2.3 are estimated
simultaneously by maximum likelihood. I construct bootstrap distributions of each parameter using a
sample size of 5000. This will be used later to facilitate the comparison between ICM estimated from
data and ICM generated from the IRBC model. The estimates of parameters in equation 2.1 are reported
in Table 2.1 on page 31.5 A significant βicm is found for the U.S. real exchange rate, indicating the
5The model does not pass the diagnostic test of function form. This problem may be caused by the missing nonlinearity
in the form of, for example, smooth transition. Adding a smooth transition mechanism allows the model to pass the
diagnostic test but does not change the estimate of other parameters.
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Figure 2.2: IRF of U.S. real exchange rate under ICM
Table 2.1: Time series model estimation
Estimated ICM
a0 β
ecm βicm σ
4.55 0.96 -0.008 0.03
(1161.05) (31.20) (-3.25)**
[4.54, 4.56] [0.88, 0.98] [-0.017, -0.006]
R2=0.91 LL= 270.60 ICM={46.44%}
AR(1)={0.60} ARCH(1)={0.90} Function form={0.01}
Notes:
1. Numbers in parentheses are t-ratio, numbers in brackets are the bootstrap 90% interval, numbers in
braces are P-values.
2. Stars next to the parentheses under βicm represent significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level. The critical value is obtained by Monte Carlo experiments because βicm > 0 makes the
model explosive and the distribution of t-statistics under the null is non-standard.
3. AR(1), ARCH(1) and function form represent the diagnostic score tests of neglected first-order serial
correlation, first-order autoregressive heteroskedasticity and general nonlinearity, respectively.
4. ICM denotes the frequency of a significant βicm in the bootstrap sample.
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appearance of ICM. The significance of βicm is tested in each bootstrap sample and the frequency of
significant βicm is about 46%.
2.3 The DSGE framework
The DSGE framework I will use is that developed by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015). The world
consists of two countries with one referred to as Home and the other as Foreign. The two countries are
symmetric unless otherwise indicated. Each country produces a tradable intermediate good using local
labour and capital. Home and Foreign intermediate goods are used to produce nontradable final goods.
The international financial market is incomplete with only one asset: a real riskless bond. To save space,
this section only presents the problems of Home country agents. The problems for the Foreign country
can be constructed in a similar way. Variables in the Foreign country are denoted with superscript “*”. I
collect equilibrium conditions of the model in appendix B.
2.3.1 Households
There is a unit mass of infinitely-lived households in each country. The representative household maximizes
ots life-time discounted utility
Et
∞∑
j=t
βj−t
[
Cτj (1− Lj)1−τ
]1−σ
1− σ ,
subject to the following budget constraint
Pt (Ct +Xt) + PH,tQtDt ≤ Pt (WtLt +RtKt−1) + PH,t [Dt−1 − Φ (Dt)] ,
and the law of motion for capital
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Xt − ψ2Kt−1
(
Xt
Kt−1
− δ
)2
.
The notation follows Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015): β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor,
τ ∈ (0, 1) is the weight on consumption in the utility function, σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital and ψ ≥ 0 controls the size of the capital adjustment
cost.
The representative household provide Lt units of labour at real wage Wt. At the beginning of each
period, the household receive capital income RtKt−1 with real rental rate Rt and interest by owning a
net stock of international assets PH,tDt−1. One unit of international asset purchased at price PH,tQt in
period t pays one unit of Home intermediate goods next period, the price of which is PH,t+1. On the
expenditure side, the household purchases final goods at price Pt for consumption (Ct) and investment
(Xt). The capital accumulation exhibits a adjustment costs. As in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003),
to induce stationarity of the model, the Home country is subjected to a portfolio adjustment cost that
depends on its net foreign asset. The adjustment cost is measured by Φ (Dt) = φ2At
(
Dt−D¯
At
)2
in units of
Home intermediate goods where At is Home country productivity.
Solving the maximization problem gives the following first-order condition with respect to Ct, Lt, Xt,
Kt and Dt:
UCt = λt,
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−ULt
UCt
=Wt,
λt = µt
[
1− ψ
(
Xt
Kt−1
− δ
)]
,
µt = βEt
[
λt+1Rt+1 + µt+1
(
1− δ + ψ2
(
X2t
K2t−1
− δ2
))]
,
Qt = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
PH,t+1/Pt+1
PH,t/Pt
)
− ∂Φ
∂Dt
,
where UL and UC are derivatives of single period utility with respect to labour and consumption,
respectively, λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint and µt is the Lagrange multiplier of
the capital law of motion. Due to the investment adjustment cost, µt/λt =
[
1− ψ
(
Xt
Kt−1
− δ
)]
forms the
shadow price (Tobin’s Q) of capital, i.e., the price of installed capital relative to a real good. The second
equation states the intratemporal trad-offs between labour disutility and labour income, and determines
labour supply. The last two equation states the intertemporal trad-offs between consumption today and
consumption next period financed by capital and international asset returns, and determines the interest
rate. The last Euler equation and its foreign counterpart define international risk-sharing.
2.3.2 Intermediate goods firms
The market of domestic intermediate goods firms is perfectly competitive. The representative intermediate
goods producer uses domestic labour and domestic capital in order to produce intermediate goods sold to
both the Home and Foreign producers of final goods. The firms maximize period-by-period profits by
solving
max
Lt,Kt−1
PH,t
(
YH,t + Y ∗H,t
)− Pt (WtLt +RtKt−1) ,
subject to the production function
YH,t + Y ∗H,t = A1−αt Kαt−1L1−αt ,
where YH,t and Y ∗H,t denote the Home intermediate goods demanded by Home and Foreign markets,
respectively, α ∈ (0, 1) is the capital share of output and At is Home country productivity cointegrated
with Foreign country productivity A∗t[
∆ lnAt
∆ lnA∗t
]
=
[
A
A∗
]
+
[
κ
−κ
] (
lnAt−1 − lnA∗t−1
)
+
[
ϵA,t
ϵA∗,t
]
, (2.4)
[
ϵA,t
ϵA∗t
]
∼ N (0,Σ) .
The first-order conditions of this problem are
Wt = (1− α)
(
PH,t
Pt
)
A1−αt K
α
t−1L
−α
t ,
Rt = α
(
PH,t
Pt
)
A1−αt K
α−1
t−1 L
1−α
t . (2.5)
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where production factors are paid for their marginal product.
2.3.3 Final goods firms
The domestic and imported intermediate goods (YH,t and YF,t) are combined by perfectly competitive
final goods firms. The key element in this model is the input adjustment cost in the production function
introduced by Erceg et al. (2005) and later used by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015), which takes the
form
Yt =
[
ω
1
σHF Y
σHF−1
σHF
H,t + (1− ω)
1
σHF (ϕtYF,t)
σHF−1
σHF
] σHF
σHF−1
,
where ω ∈ (0, 1) denotes the degree of home bias or the degree of openness, σHF > 0 is a parameter
which determines the long-run elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported intermediate
goods, ϕt =
1− ι2
(
YF,t
YH,t
YF,t−1
YH,t−1
− 1
)2 is the input adjustment cost with ι being the size of the cost. This
specification has two implications. Given the time varying ϕt, the real cost of producing one unit of
final goods will generally be time varying. Therefore, it distorts the inter-temporal decisions made by
households. Whenever the final goods firms, or equivalently the households, find it optimal to change the
ratio between domestic and imported goods, they must take the expected input adjustment cost in the
next period into account. On the other hand, the input adjustment cost implies that the imported goods
share in consumption is relatively unresponsive to the changes in its price in the short run. Therefore,
the short-run price elasticity of imported goods will be lower than σHF and intra-temporal decisions are
distorted. This is supported by the recent literature that estimates the trade elasticity; see, for example,
?. In addition, note that the cost is due to the change in the ratio between domestic and imported goods,
which suggests that the level of imported goods is allowed to jump costlessly in response to changes in
the overall consumption demand. To give a quantitative example, when ι = 900, a change of 1% in the
ratio will result in ϕt = 0.955 so that Foreign intermediate goods are 4.5% less efficient in production.
Denote Ωt,j = βt−j
λj
Pj
λt
Pt
as the stochastic discount factor and the final goods firm maximizes the
expected discount profits given by
Et
∞∑
j=t
Ωt,j (PjYj − PH,jYH,j − PF,jYF,j) ,
subject to the production function. The first-order conditions with respect to YH,t and YF,t are
Pt
∂Yt
∂YH,t
+ Et
(
Ωt,t+1Pt+1
∂Yt+1
∂YH,t
)
= PH,t,
Pt
∂Yt
∂YF,t
+ Et
(
Ωt,t+1Pt+1
∂Yt+1
∂YF,t
)
= PF,t,
where the term Et
(
Ωt,t+1Pt+1 ∂Yt+1∂YH,t
)
and Et
(
Ωt,t+1Pt+1 ∂Yt+1∂YF,t
)
appear due to the input adjustment
cost. These two terms distort the standard demand equations for YH,t and YF,t up to the point that
YH,t and YF,t also affect output next period via ϕt. In a standard model (ι = 0), substituting the two
first-order conditions into the production function yields the price index of final goods
Pt =
[
ωP 1−σHFH,t + (1− ω)P 1−σHFF,t
] 1
1−σHF ,
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and , given the Law of One Price, the real exchange rate
RERt =
[
ωP 1−σHFF,t + (1− ω)P 1−σHFH,t
] 1
1−σHF[
ωP 1−σHFH,t + (1− ω)P 1−σHFF,t
] 1
1−σHF
=
[
ω + (1− ω)
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−σHF ] 11−σHF
[
ω
(
PH,t
PF,t
)1−σHF
+ (1− ω)
] 1
1−σHF
. (2.6)
In this case, the movement of the real exchange rate is due to home bias ω > 0.5 and the volatility
is partially governed by non-unit elasticity of substitution σHF . The input adjustment cost allows
time-varying elasticity of substitution and hence introduces new dynamics into the real exchange rate. In
particular, it reallocates real exchange rate volatility across frequencies.
2.3.4 Market clearing conditions
Finally the model is closed by the final goods market clearing condition
Ct +Xt = Yt,
and the international bond market clearing condition
Dt +D∗t = 0.
2.3.5 Benchmark calibration
The parameters of the cointegration process are taken from the estimates by Rabanal et al. (2011) in
which A = 0.001, A∗ = 0.006, κ = −0.007, σA = 0.0108 and σA∗ = 0.088. The subjective discount factor
β, the consumption share in the utility function τ , the risk aversion σ, the depreciation rate δ and the
capital share in production α are set to the standard value in the literature and they are equal to 0.99,
0.34, 2, 0.025 and 0.36, respectively. There is no standard value for the cost of holding international asset
φ as the literature uses different function forms of the cost. I set this to 0.03 so that the model gets the
standard deviation of the trade balance approximately right. The rest of the parameters are calibrated to
fit the spectrum of the real exchange rate through the strategy of Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015).
I set the low home bias ω = 0.8 and a high long-run elasticity of substitution σHF = 3, the same as
Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015). The parameter of the input adjustment cost ι is set to 140.
2.4 Main Experiments
The main experiments conducted in this chapter are to investigate whether the features of real exchange
rate data reported in Section 2.2 can be generated in the model described in Section 2.3. The standard
deviation, the ACF, and the spectrum can be calculated analytically from the IRBC model and they are
expected to be reasonably close to their counterparts from the data. The integral correction mechanism
is uncovered from the IRBC model in the following way. The IRBC model is solved up to the first-order
approximation.6 The artificial real exchange rate and other variables are simulated for the same length as
the data. The parameters in equations 2.1 and 2.3 are estimated by the artificial variables. The procedure
is repeated 5000 times, which results in a Monte Carlo sample of each parameter in equations 2.1 and 2.3.
When comparing the ICM generated by the IRBC model to the ICM estimated in the data, I compare
the Monte Carlo sample to the Bootstrap sample described in Section 2.2.
6However, all the results are robust to a higher order approximation.
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Figure 2.3: Fit of ACF at different frequencies by baseline model
Note:
1. The 90CI denotes the upper and lower 90% confidence interval of the sample ACF. It is calculated by
the asymptotic normal distribution and standard deviation SE (ρh) =
√
1+2
∑h−1
i=1
ρ2
i
N where ρh denotes h
order autocorrelation and N is the sample size.
2.4.1 The baseline results
To facilitate the comparison, I use a baseline model in which the input adjustment cost is shut down by
setting ι = 0. The home bias is reset to 0.9 to match the import to output ratio in the steady state. It is
well known that the substitution between domestic and imported goods is critical for the real exchange
rate. To see this point, consider the case that the substitution between the home and foreign good is
perfect so σHF =∞. In this case, the real exchange rate will be a constant. Two values for the elasticity
of substitutionσHF are considered. When σHF = 0.55, the model does a good job at the business cycle
frequencies. It closely fits the standard deviation of the H-P filtered real exchange rate relative to that
of GDP7 (3.26 in the model and 3.3 in the data) although the standard deviation at all frequencies is
0.22, twice the size of 0.1095 in the data. In terms of the persistence at BC frequencies, the right-hand
panel of Figure 2.3 on page 36 plots the ACF of the real exchange rate at BC frequencies for the data
against the model. The data shows a fast initial decay to a negative value. The higher order of ACF is
very noisy and insignificant but the ACF of order 10 has a significant negative value. It is surprising
to find that those unusual features of ACF at BC frequencies can be generated in the baseline model.
However, the estimate of ICM on the model side only detects significant βicm in 8% of the Monte Carlo
sample. This probability is only slightly larger than the size of the test, suggesting a no or very small
integral correction mechanism in the baseline model.
The other relevant value of σHF is 0.75, which allows the model to fit the standard deviation of the
real exchange rate at all frequencies (0.1073 in the model and. 0.1095 in the data). It also increases the
frequency of the ICM appearance to 16%. However, it only explains 30% of the standard deviation at BC
frequencies (0.015 in the model and 0.051 in the data) and assigns most of the standard deviation to
frequencies lower than BC. This problem is referred to as the excess persistence of the RER in Rabanal
and Rubio-Ramirez (2015). The left-hand panel of Figure 2.3 on page 36 shows that too much persistence
is generated by the model at all frequencies, although the excess persistence problem is slightly eased as
compared to σHF = 0.55 by noting that the ACF decreases faster when σHF increases. This experiment
gives a general lesson that a model may completely miss the evolution of persistence, even if it gets the
first-order autocorrelation about right.
7The statistics generated from the IRBC model at BC frequencies is obtained by applying an H-P filter to the model.
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Table 2.2: ICM in Baseline model
βecm 90% int. βicm 90% int. p (icm)
data [0.8795, 0.9854] [-0.0172, -0.0056] 46%
σHF = 0.55 [0.9083 1.0000] [-0.0067 -0.0003] 8%
σHF = 0.75 [0.9239 1.0052] [-0.0060 -0.0003] 16%
σHF = 1.5 [0.9660 1.0208] [-0.0056 -0.0000] 63%
σHF = 3.0 [0.9793 1.0312] [-0.0060 -0.0000] 90%
Notes: p (icm) is the frequency of significant ICM in the Monte Carlo or Bootstrap sample.
Using ACF instead of the spectrum, I replicate the results discussed in Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez
(2015) which suggest that the performance of the baseline model faces a trade off between low frequencies
and BC frequencies. In order to fit the real exchange rate features at BC frequencies, the model generates
extra persistence and is volatile at low frequencies. On the other hand, if the model fits the features at
all frequencies, the model underestimates the persistence and the volatility at BC frequencies. Therefore,
the model is unable to fit the shape of the spectrum. The new finding here is the relationship between
the substitution σHF and the frequency of the ICM appearance. To investigate this relationship further, I
run another two experiments using σHF equal to 1.5 and 3, respectively. Table 2.2 on page 37 reports the
estimates of ICM under different values of σHF . First, note that the frequency of ICM occurrence (p (icm))
is increasing along the σHF . However, given that the estimate of βicm remains at a small magnitude, the
increase of p (icm) is only caused by the smaller standard deviation in the residual. On the other hand,
more volatility of the real exchange rate is explained by a higher βecm. Using the interpretation of βecm
and βicm discussed in Section 2.2, a higher substitution between domestic and imported intermediate
goods increases the volatility of the real exchange rate by increasing its conventional persistence while
the cyclical persistence remains at a small magnitude.
2.4.2 The workhorse model
Adding the input adjustment cost helps the model reallocate the variance of the real exchange rate at
different frequencies. The upper half of Figure 2.4 on page 38 shows the fit of the spectrum and ACF.
Using the benchmark calibration, this model can fit the spectrum very well. The ACF of the model
at all frequencies now lies well within the confidence interval of the data, fixing the excess persistence
problem in the baseline model. It also has the cyclical movement. However, the magnitude of the cyclical
movement is negligible as compared to the data. Together with the initial fast decay, the ACF suggests
the real exchange rate to be a very smooth process.
I now turn to the estimates of ICM using simulations of the workhorse model. The 90% confidence
interval of βicm is [-0.0170, -0.0017] in the Monte Carlo sample, covering the point estimate in the data
-0.0084. The 90% confidence interval of βecm [0.8493, 0.9621] covers the point estimate in data 0.96 at
the margin. The lower panel of Figure 2.4 on page 38 compares the distribution of βicm and βecm in
the IRBC Monte Carlo sample and the data Bootstrap sample. It shows that the model explains the
volatility of the real exchange rate by underestimating the magnitude of cyclical persistence βicm and
overestimating the magnitude of conventional persistence βecm. The frequency at which ICM is found
statistically significant is only 18% in the model while this prequency is 46% in the data. Nevertheless,
the workhorse model is an improvement over the baseline model.
Can we push the workhorse model further? To answer this question, I first argue that the perfect fit
of the spectrum like Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015)’s strategy is likely to suffer from “over-fitting”.
Unlike the population ACF and spectrum, the sample ACF does not correspond exactly to the sample
spectrum. Hence, fitting exactly one of them may miss the information that is contained in the other. I
propose a calibration strategy that fits both the spectrum and ACF reasonably well in the sense that
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Figure 2.4: Compare real exchange rate features in the data to the workhorse model with benchmark
calibration
the IRBC model captures the basic shape of the spectrum and ACF and lie in the 90% interval. Given
that the sample ACF and the spectrum contain similar but slightly different information, this strategy
should ease the over-fitting problem. In my final calibration, I substantially increase the ι to 900. The
home bias ω and the portfolio adjustment cost φ are slightly adjusted to 0.82 and 0.05, respectively. This
calibration generates excess volatility for a wide range of variables. Therefore, I replace the cointegration
productivity process by a stationary VAR(1) process,[
logAt
logA∗t
]
=
[
0.97 0.025
0.025 0.97
][
logAt−1
logA∗t−1
]
+
[
ϵt
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]
,
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ϵ∗t
]
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(
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)
,
StD (ϵt) = 0.0073, StD (ϵ∗t ) = 0.0044, Corr (ϵt, ϵ∗t ) = 0.29,
estimated by Heathcote and Perri (2002).8 The standard deviation of the real exchange rate is now
0.1075, the same as the benchmark calibration and data. Figure 2.5 on page 39 reports the good fits of
ACF and the spectrum. The frequency of the ICM occurrence is 41.68%. The magnitude of βecm and
βicm is much closer to the data. As compared to the benchmark calibration, the 90% interval of βicm
8The difference between the stationary VAR(1) technology and the cointegration technology is discussed by Rabanal
et al. (2011). They find that the cointegration technology is preferred; however, their analysis focuses on business cycle
frequencies only. There is no evidence supporting cointegration technology if the aim is to explain the real exchange rate at
all frequencies. However, one may wonder why the real exchange rate at all frequencies should be explained by a model that
either does not incorporate trends or does not seriously capture the trends (in the case of productivity containing unit roots,
for example). In the real word, the real exchange rate of a pair of countries is usually stationary serious even if the growth
rates of these two economies are persistently different. Therefore, I assume that the properties of the real exchange rate at
all frequencies have nothing to do with the trend.
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Figure 2.5: Compare real exchange rate features in the data to the workhorse model with a modified
calibration
increases (in absolute) to [-0.0166, -0.0031] and the 90% interval of βecm increases to [0.8637, 0.9728].
Hence, the new calibration explains the volatility real exchange rate using a larger conventional and
cyclical persistence and a smaller standard deviation in the residual. To summarize, the model developed
by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2015) is able to capture a wide range of real exchange rate features with
appropriate calibration and stationary productivity.
2.5 Microeconomic foundation of the integral correction mech-
anism
So far, it is clear that the baseline model can only generate a highly volatile real exchange rate by increasing
its conventional persistence so it is unable to capture the cyclical persistence. The workhorse model fixes
this problem by adding an input adjustment cost, which makes the trade elasticity time-varying. To
investigate the micro-foundation of the integral correction mechanism and the DSGE model, it is useful
to use micro evidence of trade elasticities to regulate the key parameter ι and σHF . As Imbs and Mejean
(2015) suggest, one-sector macroeconomic model should be calibrated using weighted average of micro
elasticities (sector level elasticities) instead of macro elasticities (elasticities estimated from aggregate
data) to avoid odd predictions. Imbs and Mejean (2016) further estimate macro elasticities that are
equivalent to the micro ones in terms of welfare implications. The estimates range from 1.5 to 5, which
justifies σHF = 3. Other papers using more standard econometric methods (e.g. Bahmani-Oskooee and
Kara, 2005, and working papers of the Global Trade Analysis Project) typically report smaller macro
elasticities due to heterogeneity bias, argued by Imbs and Mejean (2015). However, There are only few
papers that distinguish between short- and long- term elasticities. For example, Gallaway et al. (2003)
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response function under a different value of ι
Note: The notations follow Section 2.3 except that prices in this graph are defined relative to the final
good price.
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estimate micro elasticities, and Hooper et al. (2000) estimate macro elasticities. Both papers conclude
that the short-term elasticities are roughly half or below half of the long-term ones.
In the DSGE model, it is difficult to form an analytical expression of short-run elasticity. Instead,
I define a “pseudo” elasticity as σpseudoHF,k = − yˆH,t+k−yˆF,t+kpˆH,t+k−pˆF,t+k , where a hat denotes the log deviation from
the steady state following a shock at t. The short-term elasticity can be treated as σpseudoHF,1 or a average
over the first few periods, depending on how the short-term elasticity is measured in empirical research.
Given this definition, the short-term elasticity is half of the long-term elasticity when ι is around 10, or
comparable to the micro evidence in level when ι is around 125. For the final calibration ι = 900, the
short-term elasticity is about 0.05. Overall, the input adjustment cost that is required to match features
of the real exchange rate is relative stronger than that suggested by micro evidence.
In the following, I study how the integral correction mechanism is generated from the DSGE model. I
calculate impulse responses to a positive Home productivity shock in the workhorse model with final
calibration and analyse the sensitivity by varying ι. Three domains of ι are relevant. The first is of
course 0, by which the cost is shut down. The second domain is (0, 245) during which the sensitivity
analysis shows that a larger size of the cost increases the volatility of the real exchange rate. However, the
volatility of the real exchange rate starts to decrease when ι>245. In addition, the basic shape of impulse
responses remains within each domain but varies across domains. The benchmark calibration falls into
the second domain and the final calibration falls into the third. Figure 2.6 on page 40 reports the impulse
responses of workhorse models by 3*2 blocks. Each row of the blocks is reported for ι equal to 0 (case 1),
150 (case 2) and 900 (case 3), respectively. The left-hand column of blocks contains the intra-temporal
variables and the right-hand column contains inter-temporal variables. All prices are defined relative to
the local final goods price.
Let us start with a baseline model in which ι = 0 shuts down the cost and the standard results of
the IRBC model apply. On the impact of the shock, the right-hand panel shows that both the capital
return and the interest rate increase in the Home country. Households in the Home country smooth
their consumption by increasing today’s consumption. The higher return in the Home country induces
more investment which, together with increasing consumption, push up aggregate demand y. Since the
financial markets are integrated, households in the Foreign country find it beneficial to shift resources
to the more productive location, the Home country. They do so by lending and exporting to the Home
country. Consequently, investment in the Foreign country decreases but consumption increases because
the Foreign country enjoys a wealth effect due to lending and a terms of trade effect as follows.
The terms of trade effect can be seen from the left-hand panel, which plots the components of aggregate
demand. Higher capital return (together with the associated higher wage) and higher productivity in the
Home country have opposite effects on the marginal cost of producing Home intermediate goods. Since
the perfect competitive intermediate goods firms set price PH equal to the marginal cost, the decrease in
PH indicates that the effect of a higher capital return is smaller than the effect of higher productivity. PF
increases because of the higher foreign capital rent and a zero or mild increase in productivity. It turns
out that the Home country terms of trade PFPH and, according to equation 2.6, RER depreciate (increase).
The real exchange rate also features a hump shape because the spillover of Home country productivity to
the Foreign country has a lag, which causes asynchronous movements between the capital return in the
Home and Foreign country, see the discussion of Steinsson (2008).
When the input adjustment cost is introduced, it has two effects on the model. First, it makes the
final goods more expensive when the households want to change the ratio between Home and Foreign
goods. Therefore, the inter-temporal substitution of final goods is distorted. Second, the cost changes the
intra-temporal substitution between Home and Foreign goods because domestic goods are not subject to
this cost.
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When ι is in the second domain, the world households still find it optimal to shift more resources
to the Home country. The Foreign country lends and exports to the Home country as in case 1. This
behavior causes a surge in the input adjustment cost (in the absolute, as below) so that economic activities
in the Home country, including consumption and investment, actually go down. However, households
expect that the input adjustment cost will be diminishing fast as they need not change the domestic to
imported goods ratio to any considerable extent in the future. Several periods later, households in the
Home country can start enjoying their higher productivity and raise consumption and investment. This
expectation explains why world households would shift resources to the home country in the first place.
Although Home country households suffer from a decrease in consumption in the first few periods, the
net benefit during their life time is still positive. On the other hand, given this expectation, the interest
rate is low on the impact of the shock, which helps us reduce the marginal cost and the price of the
Home good. It is clear from the figure that the initial response of PH is much larger than in case 1. As a
consequence, the response of terms of trade and the real exchange rate is much larger. The standard
deviation of the real exchange rate increases in case 2. Another feature of the real exchange rate in
this case is that it reverts more quickly to steady state. Since the interest rate difference between two
countries is larger, the real exchange rate has to move fast in order to conform to the uncovered interest
rate parity. Moreover, note that the hump shape response of the real exchange rate disappears because of
the more synchronized (although in a different direction) movement of the interest rate in each country.
When the input adjustment cost is rapidly disappearing as expected, the difference in productivity in
the two countries still exists. The new round of resource shifting once more increases the input adjustment
cost although the magnitude is much smaller this time. The cyclical movement of the input adjustment
cost is transmitted to all macroeconomic variables, including the real exchange rate as captured by ICM.
If ι is in the third domain, the cost is so large that it is no longer optimal to shift resources from the
Foreign country to the Home country. Instead, Home country households lend and export to the Foreign
country. Consequently, the direction of the real exchange rate response is reversed. The Home economy
in case 3 behaves just like the Foreign country in case 2. The difference is that the exporter in case 3
has a larger response on impact than the exporter in case 2 because the former also enjoys a positive
productivity shock. Also note that the initial response of ϕt is smaller than in case 2, which suggests
that households have to reduce the input adjustment cost by keeping the changes in YF,tYH,t smaller. This is
why increasing ι in the third domain makes the volatility of the real exchange rate smaller. On the other
hand, the cyclical movement of ϕt is more persistent, which is transmitted to all other macroeconomic
variables. The input adjustment cost is not the only mechanism implying a persistent oscillations of all
variables. Researchers highlighting self-fulfilling expectation shocks, also referred to as “sunspots” shocks,
also find this type of behaviour. In particular, see a two-country model studied by Xiao (2004).
To summarize this, the impulse responses of the real exchange rate are very close to those implied
by ICM and resemble the shape of ACF. This helps to explain the PPP puzzle further because, in the
presence of the input adjustment cost, the impulse response of the real exchange rate to a persistent AR(1)
productivity process features a fast reversion to steady state in the short run and a cyclical movement in
the long run. This particular dynamics reduces the variance in the short run (higher frequencies) and
increases the variance in the long run (low frequencies). In contrast, the conventional belief is that high
volatility is mainly driven by nominal shocks and the persistence is caused by persistent real shocks.
Another finding in this section is that the size of the cost can alter the direction of the initial response of
the real exchange rate.
2.6 Other dimensions of the model 43
2.6 Other dimensions of the model
Before conclude, I comment on the performance of the model in other dimensions, including how the
model can capture the domestic and international business cycle, by comparing the second moments of
H-P filtered key macroeconomic variables.
The results are reported in Table 2.3 on page 44 where I report the (relative) standard deviation of
GDP (Y), the trade balance to GDP ratio (TB/Y), consumption (C), investment (X) and employment
(L) as well as the relevant domestic and international correlations. The upper block of the table suggests
that introducing an input adjustment cost does not sacrifice the ability to capture domestic business
cycle features. As compared to the standard model, it actually makes some minor improvement. An
important implication of the input adjustment cost, regardless of the size of the cost, is that GDP
and the real exchange rate respond in opposite directions to a productivity shock. This is reflected in
the negative correlation between the real exchange rate and GDP, which is consistent with the data.
However, the correlation in the model is too high in absolute value. On the other hand, the trade
balance becomes pro-cyclical and again independent of the size of the input adjustment cost.9 Turning to
the bottom block of the table, it is well known that international quantitative properties of standard
international business cycle models are at odds with the data. A model with homogeneous goods across
countries (substitution σHF goes to infinity) typically generates a low or negative cross-correlation of
output, a higher consumption cross-correlation than that of output, and a negative cross-correlation of
investment and employment (Backus et al., 1992; Baxter, 1995, among others). Allowing heterogeneous
but substitutable goods gives quantitative results that are closer to the data but do not fix the “anomalies”
named by Backus et al. (1993); see the row labelled ι = 0. The main drawback of my model with an input
adjustment cost is the strong negative cross-country correlation among all main variables, which makes
the problem even worse. The negative cross-correlation of output is closer to the homogeneous goods
model than to the heterogeneous goods model. Given the time varying short-run substitution between
domestic and foreign goods in my model, this feature seems odd. Fortunately, a vast literature has tried
to fix the international anomalies by introducing new features into the models. In particular, financial
integration via a nontrivial banking sector is promising in increasing the cross-country comovement.
Adding those new features may help the model here but it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
2.7 Summary
This chapter aims at examining the ability of IRBC models to explain several features of the real exchange
rate, in particular the integral correction mechanism found by chapter 1. I document that the US effective
real exchange rate features high volatility, a cyclical movement of ACF, a positively skewed spectrum,
and a significant integral correction mechanism representation. I find that the standard IRBC model
is able to fit one or two features but faces a trade off to fit all of them. A workhorse model can closely
match all features seen in the data by introducing an input adjustment cost of imported goods in the final
goods production. However, the required input adjustment cost is relative stronger than that suggested
by micro evidence. I argue that the input adjustment cost helps resolve the PPP puzzle with three
new features in the impulse response of the real exchange rate to a persistent real shock: 1) The initial
response to a positive shock is negative, 2) The deviation from steady state decays very fast in the short
run, and 3) There are persistent cyclical movements in the long run.
Further work on real exchange rate modelling at low frequencies should be carried out in at least
two ways. First, this chapter only suggests the input adjustment cost as a candidate mechanism to
9The model in this chapter does not incorporate a capital adjustment cost, which should fix this problem as suggested
by ?.
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Table 2.3: Moment Matching
it is easy to show that
StD(Y) StD(TB/Y) StD(C)/StD(Y) StD(X)/StD(Y) StD(L)/StD(Y)
data 1.58 0.45 0.76 4.55 0.75
ι = 0 1.12 0.19 0.54 2.51 0.31
ι = 900 1.50 0.80 0.60 4.10 1.00
Correlation
Corr(Y,C) Corr(Y,X) Corr(Y,L) Corr(Y,TB) Corr(Y,RER)
data 0.84 0.91 0.87 -0.36 -0.14
ι = 0 0.91 0.97 0.97 -0.65 0.82
ι = 900 0.87 0.99 0.96 0.92 -0.95
Corr(Y,Y*) Corr(C,C*) Corr(X,X*) Corr(L,L*)
data 0.44 0.36 0.28 0.40
ι = 0 0.33 0.81 -0.05 -0.05
ι = 900 -0.77 -0.75 -0.95 -0.98
Note: The statistics of the data is taken from Rabanal et al. (2011). The data ranges from 1973:1 to
2006:4, which is an extension of the standard statistics used in the literature, see Backus et al. (1994) and
Heathcote and Perri (2002) among others. The row labelledι = 0 is a standard two-country two-goods
model used in 2.4.1, which is close to the one studied by Heathcote and Perri (2002). The row labelled
ι = 900 is the model with an input adjustment cost and final calibration. All statistics (including both
data and model) are based on logged (except for net exports) and Hodrick-Prescott-filtered data with a
smoothing parameter of 1,600.
explain real exchange rates at all frequencies, in particularly at frequencies lower than business cycle. I
make no attempt to estimate the key parameter ι against other possible mechanisms. Since the input
adjustment cost alone falls short in explaining data, it is helpful to examine the input adjustment cost in
a richer model. For example, Drozd et al. (2017) propose another way to disconnect the short- and the
long-run trade elasticity by introducing searching friction. They show that this feature helps to resolve
the trade-comovement puzzle, partially through a risk-sharing channel. Second, the model studied in this
chapter either has no trend or has a exogenous trend. This kind of models has a chance to shed lights
on real exchange rates at low frequencies only if we are willing to assume that economic growth is to a
large extent independent to real exchange rates, which is unlikely to be true according to, for instance,
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect. Comin and Gertler (2006) point out a medium-frequency cycle that is
typically filtered out together with the trend. In their endogenous growth model, medium-term cycle is
driven by standard high-frequency shocks that propagates through the economy via technological change
and R&D. Therefore, a more appropriate way to study real exchange rate at all frequencies could be to
allow endogenous productivity in the spirit Comin and Gertler (2006), technology diffusion and catch-up
in a multi-country model. The low frequency real exchange rate can be explained by at least two channel,
i.e., a endogenous Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect and the medium-frequency cycle.
Appendix B
This appendix collects the equilibrium conditions of the workhorse model. Since Pt and P ∗t are not
determined without specifying monetary policy, I define P˜H,t = PH,tPt ,P˜F,t =
PF,t
Pt
, P˜ ∗F,t =
P∗F,t
P∗t
, P˜ ∗H,t =
P∗H,t
P∗t
.
Assuming Law of One Price gives P˜H,t = P˜ ∗H,tRERt and P˜F,t = P˜ ∗F,tRERt where RERt is the real
exchange rate.
Marginal utility of consumption:
τ
Ct
[
Cτt (1− Lt)1−τ
]1−σ
= λt,
τ
C∗t
[
C∗τt (1− L∗t )1−τ
]1−σ
= λ∗t
Labour supply:
1− τ
τ
Ct
1− Lt =Wt,
1− τ
τ
C∗t
1− L∗t
=W ∗t ,
Capital accumulation:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +Xt − ψ2Kt−1
(
Xt
Kt−1
− δ
)2
,
K∗t = (1− δ)K∗t−1 +X∗t −
ψ
2K
∗
t−1
(
X∗t
K∗t−1
− δ
)2
.
Capital investment decisions:
λt[
1− ψ
(
Xt
Kt−1
− δ
)] = βEt
λt+1Rt+1 + λt+1[
1− ψ
(
Xt+1
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λ∗t+1R∗t+1 + λ∗t+1[
1− ψ
(
X∗t+1
K∗t
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(
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Euler equations:
Qt = βEt
(
λt+1
λt
P˜H,t+1/Pt+1
P˜H,t/Pt
)
− φDt,
Qt = βEt
(
λ∗t+1
λ∗t
P˜H,t+1/RERt+1
P˜H,t/RERt
)
.
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Intermediate goods production:
YH,t + Y ∗H,t = A1−αt Kαt−1L1−αt ,
YF,t + Y ∗F,t = A∗1−αt K∗αt−1L∗1−αt .
Labour demand:
Wt = (1− α) P˜H,tA1−αt Kαt−1L−αt ,
W ∗t = (1− α) P˜ ∗F,tA∗1−αt K∗αt−1L∗−αt .
Capital demand:
Rt = αP˜H,tA1−αt Kα−1t−1 L1−αt ,
R∗t = αP˜ ∗F,tA∗1−αt K∗α−1t−1 L∗1−αt .
Final goods production:
Yt =
[
ω
1
σHF Y
σHF−1
σHF
H,t + (1− ω)
1
σHF (ϕtYF,t)
σHF−1
σHF
] σHF
σHF−1
,
Y ∗t =
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ω
1
σHF Y
∗σHF−1σHF
F,t + (1− ω)
1
σHF
(
ϕ∗tY
∗
H,t
)σHF−1
σHF
] σHF
σHF−1
.
Impute adjustment costs:
ϕt =
1− ι2
 YF,tYH,t
YF,t−1
YH,t−1
− 1
2
 ,
ϕ∗t =
1− ι2
 Y ∗H,tY ∗F,t
Y ∗
H,t−1
Y ∗
F,t−1
− 1
2
 .
Demand for Home intermediate goods:
Pt
∂Yt
∂YH,t
+ Et
(
Ωt,t+1Pt+1
∂Yt+1
∂YH,t
)
= PH,t,
P ∗t
∂Y ∗t
∂Y ∗H,t
+ Et
(
Ω∗t,t+1P ∗t+1
∂Y ∗t+1
∂Y ∗H,t
)
= P ∗H,t.
Demand for Foreign intermediate goods:
Pt
∂Yt
∂YF,t
+ Et
(
Ωt,t+1Pt+1
∂Yt+1
∂YF,t
)
= PF,t,
P ∗t
∂Y ∗t
∂Y ∗F,t
+ Et
(
Ω∗t,t+1P ∗t+1
∂Y ∗t+1
∂Y ∗F,t
)
= P ∗F,t.
Net foreign assets:
QtDt = Y ∗H,t − P˜F,tYF,t +Dt−1 −
φ
2D
2
t .
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Market clearing conditions:
Ct +Xt = Yt,
C∗t +X∗t = Y ∗t .
Steady-state variables are solved by a numerical solver. However, since the input adjustment cost
equals to 1 in steady state, the steady-state real exchange rate is given by equation 1.2, which equals to
one if assuming zero net foreign asset in the first period.
Chapter 3
Optimal Cooperative and
Non-Cooperative Unconventional
Monetary Policy Under
Commitment
3.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis involved a significant disruption to financial intermediation, as evidenced by
limited access to credit (e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) and high credit spreads. Such disruption
can propagate internationally via integrated financial markets. To stabilize the financial system, fiscal
and monetary authorities in major economies acted jointly and introduced new policy tools. These new
tools included the provision of large-scale liquidity, and resulted in balance sheets of some central banks
expanding 20 percent to 30 percent of GDP. The new tools break away from conventional monetary
policy, which may have reached its effective lower bound, and are commonly known as unconventional
monetary policies (UMPs).1 In the last ten years, different sets of UMPs have been employed at different
stages. For example, the Federal Reserve mainly used an expanded discount window in the early stage of
the 2007-2008 crisis. After the Lehmann failure, the Fed started its asset purchase programs (quantitative
easing, or QE) and injected equity into the financial system. The Fed started to taper the QE at the
end of 2013, and ceased it in October 2014, after which the Federal Reserve has kept the size of its
balance sheet constant by buying just enough to replace maturing securities. The European Central Bank
(ECB) employed two series of Targeted longer-term refinancing operations in June 2014 and March 2016
respectively. The ECB initialized its asset purchase programs at a relatively small scale, slightly later
than the Federal Reserve. The ECB formally introduced QE in 2015 and further increased the amount
purchased in late 2016. The ECB also used equity injections during this period.
By employing UMP, policymakers hope to reduce long-term interest rates, boost lending, and stimulate
real activity. In the meantime, conventional monetary policy can play an active role if its transmission
channel via credit and financial markets is restored (Altavilla et al., 2016). As a probably unintended
consequence, domestic interventions into markets of intentionally traded assets also affect financial
conditions in foreign countries. Although much work has been devoted to evaluating the effectiveness of
1These policies may not be strictly monetary policy. For example, Kollmann et al. (2013) consider government support
for banks as fiscal policy. I use the terms unconventional policy and unconventional monetary policy interchangeably.
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UMP,2 a normative analysis is still missing, namely, what is the optimal way of conducting unconventional
policy, especially when foreign countries may take a free-ride on domestic policy. A normative analysis
does not only provide a natural benchmark against which we can evaluate certain policy implementations
but also sheds some light on critical policy decisions.
In this chapter, I study optimal unconventional policy under commitment (Ramsey policy) and aim to
address three questions. First, which of the three unconventional policies, namely public asset purchases,
discount window lending, and equity injections into banks, is more effective. More generally, what are the
factors that affect policy effectiveness. Second, how should the optimal policy respond to a foreign or
domestic shock that may trigger a global financial crisis. Then, how should a central bank exit from its
policy. Since UMP may not be permanent, the exit from policy is particularly interesting after a decade
of the crisis because central banks start to discuss shrinking their large balance sheet. For instance,
in a blog article, Bernanke (2017) argues from a policy communication perspective that the shrinkage
should be done in a passive and predictable way. Third, what is the difference between cooperative policy
coordinated across countries and non-cooperative policy conducted strategically by independent central
banks.
The literature has identified several channels through which UMP works. One is a signalling channel
(Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014; Christensen and Rudebusch, 2012), which means an announcement of
interventions lowers market expectations about future short-term rates, and therefore current long-term
rates. Christensen and Gillan (2017) argue that introducing the central bank as a large committed buyer
to financial markets lowers liquidity premiums of targeted assets. However, Kandrac (2014) finds evidence
that this effect can be negative when trading among private participants decreases too much. With
segmentation of the market for reserves, Christensen and Krogstrup (2016) demonstrate that reserve
expansions associated with UMP can affect long-term rates through a portfolio channel even in the
absence of interventions in the long-term asset market. (Unconventional) monetary policy may affect
banks willingness take on risk exposures, and hence affect financial conditions via the risk-taking channel
(Angeloni et al., 2015; Borio and Zhu, 2012; Bruno and Shin, 2015; Coimbra and Rey, 2017). Chakraborty
et al. (2017) discuss an origination channel that is specific to the Fed’s purchases of mortgage-backed
securities.
As a first step toward a comprehensive analysis of optimal unconventional policy, however, this chapter
focuses on a capital gain channel, which has received much attention and been well tested in data yet
not fully understood in terms of optimality.3 This channel is particular relevant in a multi-country
context because, with financial market integration, asset returns are synchronised internationally. To
this aim, I consider a simple two-country model where each country has a stylized multinational banking
2It is relatively well established that UMP reduces long-term interest rates. See, among many others, Gagnon et al. (2011)
and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2011) for the Federal Reserve’s QE, and Joyce et al. (2011) and Christensen and
Rudebusch (2012) for the Bank of England’s QE. However, UMP can have insignificant or unintended real effects through
the bank lending channel, as shown by Chakraborty et al. (2017) and Acharya et al. (2017). Negro et al. (2017) evaluate
the Fed’s QE using a DSGE model with a borrowing constraint and a resaleability constraint. Mouabbi and Sahuc (2016)
estimate a DSGE model in which the macroeconomic effects of the ECB’s UMP are equivalent to that of a negative shadow
short-term rate. Borio and Zabai (2016) provide a review of a border range of issues related to UMP, such as a taxonomy of
unconventional measures, diminishing returns and long-term effectiveness of UMP.
3It could complicate the model significantly to consider other channels. For example, the signalling channel and policies
such as forward guidance requires information frictions. Solving Ramsey optimal policy in such as complicated model is very
difficult. Using a framework similar to that of Bernanke et al. (1999), it is possible to incorporate the risk-taking channel
into a simple model. I choose not to do so because it is not clear whether taking more risks is harmful or beneficial to the
economy. Encouraging risk-taking is modeled as costs of policy in some papers (Coimbra and Rey, 2017) but as benefits of
policy in others (Brunnermeier and Koby, 2017; Pancost and Robatto, 2017). The answer to this question demands some
empirical evidence and could be country specific.
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sector similar to that in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).45 Banks face a balance sheet constraint (financial
constraint) derived from an agency problem between the banks and their depositors. The constraint is
slack in normal times but binds endogenously in a financial crisis, which constitutes the systemic risk in
this model.6 Given their high leverage, these banks are vulnerable to shocks having negative impact on
the value of their assets and to financial shocks that tighten their balance sheet. When the balance sheet
constraint binds, banks have difficulties of rolling over their short-term debts, which leads to a collapse
in asset prices and investment. With multinational banks, the deteriorated balance sheet condition has
a global impact, which also means that there will be large spillovers of unconventional policy from one
country to another. The basic mechanism of the capital gain channel is as follows. Unconventional policy
provides liquidity to support asset prices. Banks holding these assets have an improved balance sheet
condition. Consequently, the policy leads to more lending to the non-financial sector.7
My main findings are as follows. First, unconventional policy effectively crowds out deposits received
by banks. The crowding-out effect is mitigated if the policy relaxes the financial constraint that banks
face. I find public asset purchases, while constitute the main policy that has been employed in many
countries, have relatively larger crowding-out effect. The most efficient policy, i.e. equity injections, has
the smallest crowding-out effect. Second, domestic and foreign policy respond asymmetrically to shocks.
The degree of asymmetry depends on the nature of the shock, the cost of interventions, and the bank’s
portfolio. After a relatively strong response in same period when a shock hits (i.e., in a non-prudential
manner), the central bank exits from its interventions in accordance with the deleveraging of the banks,
the speed of which depends on the crowding-out effect. Overall, due to the precautionary effects of the
occasionally binding constraints, the exit is slow and lasts even after the economy has escaped from the
financial constraints. Third, the difference between cooperative and noncooperative policy is a weakly
increasing function of the intervention cost. There is no cooperation gain if the intervention cost is
small. Increasing the intervention cost to a certain point generates positive gains to cooperation. In the
noncooperative equilibrium, the interventions are too strong in one country, but too weak in the other.
I contribute to the literature that examines the capital gain channel of unconventional policy. The
literature has focused on simple rules or a particular policy scheme. The work of Dedola et al. (2013),
which is most closely related to this chapter, studies the international dimension of public asset purchases
in an economy where the financial constraint in each country is always binding. In their consideration of
a credit spread rule, the lack of policy cooperation reduces the policy responses in both countries, which
is in sharp contrast to my result. My discussion about the exit problem is linked to Foerster (2015) who
also suggests slowly unwinding the central bank’s balance sheet. I find that, due to a precautionary effect,
the exit speed is even slower than what Foerster (2015) suggests. He and Krishnamurthy (2013) compare
multiple policies: borrowing subsidies, equity injections, and public asset purchases. They also find that
equity injections lead to the fastest recovery. Their comparison is based on a particular policy scheme
that corresponds to the actual policy employed during the recent crisis. Ellison and Tischbirek (2014)
and Quint and Rabanal (2017) investigate if asset purchase programs could be valuable in normal times.
4Earlier, i.e. before the recent crisis, models with financial frictions do not seem to have very big effects. For example,
Linde et al. (2016) shows that the financial accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999) has only a modest quantitative effect on
the impulse response functions. Kocherlakota (2000) provide similar findings for the Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) type credit
constraints. Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013) compare the empirical performance of the standard New Keynesian DSGE
model with variants that incorporate financial frictions proposed pre-crisis. They find no significant improvement on the
performance of the benchmark model, either in terms of marginal likelihoods or impulse response functions. So, the earlier
frameworks are unlikely to be suitable for the purpose of this chapter.
5Evidence for increasingly global banking and integrated financial markets can be found in Devereux and Yetman (2010),
Perri and Quadrini (2011), Fillat et al. (2015), and Bank for International Settlements’ international banking statistics.
6While the banks in this model will never actually default, Coimbra and Rey (2017) precisely define systemic risk as a
state in which generalized solvency issues take place.
7In models with imperfectly substitute assets, especially assets with different maturities, this channel is also referred to
as the portfolio balance channel. And the effect of interventions on asset prices is reflected by the yield curve. See, for
example, Negro et al. (2017) and Quint and Rabanal (2017).
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The former paper jointly optimises the parameters in the interest rate and the asset purchase rules while
the latter optimises the asset purchase rules conditional on a estimated Taylor rule.
Implications made in this chapter could be relevant to recent work on other channels of UMP, and
the effective lower bound and negative interest rates of monetary policy. For example, Brunnermeier
and Koby (2017) build a model where a effective lower bound of the conventional monetary policy is
determined partially by financial constraints that banks face. They suggest that, due to the crowding-out
effect, QE should only be employed when conventional monetary policy hits its effective lower bound. My
result implies that equity injection policy could be used more freely thanks to its very small crowding-out
effect. Moreover, banks’ risk-taking behaviours are constrained by their net worth, which is improved by
UMP via the capital gain channel. So this chapter is related to the risk-taking literature.
This chapter also relates to the literature that works on occasionally binding constraints (OBCs) as a
source of nonlinearity. The benefits of this setting is to introduce asymmetry such that we can capture
the sudden and discrete nature of a financial crisis, and eliminate the financial accelerator mechanism
during normal times (Del Negro et al., 2016; Swarbrick et al., 2017). In this chapter, the OBC setting
also means that unconventional policy may be conducted only when the constraint is binding. More
importantly, the risk of the constraint being binding in the future has strong precautionary effects on the
Ramsey policy.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents a two-country model with
occasionally binding financial constraints. After describing my numerical method in section 3.3, sections
3.4 and 3.5 report the main results for cooperative and noncooperative policy, respectively. The last
section concludes.
3.2 The Model
The model mostly follows Dedola et al. (2013), which extends the two-country real business cycle model
(Backus et al., 1992) by including a Gertler and Karadi (2011) style financial friction. The world economy
consists of two countries, Home and Foreign, that are symmetric before being hit by a shock. In each
country, domestic labour and capital are used to produce homogeneous goods, which can be used for
consumption and capital production. To finance their capital, goods producers borrow from banks. Banks
receive deposits from households in both countries and lend to goods producers in both countries. 8I use
the term “non-financial sector” to refer to households and producers of goods and capital, and the term
“financial sector” to refer to banks. The problem facing each agent in the Home economy is described in
this section. Foreign variables are denoted by “*”. Lower case letters denote individual variables and real
prices while upper case letters denote aggregate variables and nominal prices.
3.2.1 Households
There is a unit-continuum of infinitely lived households. Households consume homogeneous goods, supply
labour, and save. The menu of assets available to households includes a deposit in domestic banks, dh,t,
a deposit in foreign banks, df,t, and a domestic government bond, bt. Without loss of generality, only
domestic citizens can hold their own government’s bonds. All these assets are risk-free one-period bonds
denominated in terms of the issuing country’s goods and paying gross real return, rt or, r∗t . Households
also hold shares in non-financial firms.
Each household consists of workers and bankers who pool consumption risk perfectly. Workers provide
labour to goods producers and bring wages to the household. Bankers manage a bank and transfer the
8Deposit market segmentation would change the results mildly up to a misallocation of household savings. On the other
hand, the security market integration is a key channel for shock propagation. In a slightly different context, Brunnermeier
and Sannikov (2015) consider the case of an integrated deposit market but an separated security market.
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profits to the household when they exit from the business. It is convenient to assume that households do
not save in their own banks. Complete consumption insurance allows me to express the problem facing
the consolidated representative household. The representative household chooses consumption, ct, labour
supply, lt, and end-of-period wealth, consisting of domestic bonds, dh,t + bt and foreign bonds, df,t to
maximize their expected discounted life-time utility, taking the wage rate and the interest rate as given:
Et
∞∑
j=0
βt,t+j
[
(ct+j − hct+j−1)1−σ
1− σ − χ
l1+ϕt+j
1 + ϕ
]
,
where h ∈ [0, 1) is the habit parameter, σ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ϕ > 0 is the
inverse of the (Frisch) elasticity of labour supply, χ ≥ 0 is the relative utility weight on labour, and βt,t+j
is the subjective discount factor from period t to t+ j. To induce stationarity with incomplete financial
markets, the discount factor is assumed to depend on aggregate consumption relative to aggregate income,
βt,t+1 = β¯ + ψβ log
(
Ct
Yt
)
, following Kollmann (2016). Denoting Πt as the net profit distribution that the
household earns from its ownership of banks and non-financial firms, wt as the real wage rate, τw,t as a
tax rate on wages, Tt as a lump-sum tax, the household faces the budget constraint
ct + dh,t + bt + df,t = (1− τw,t)wtlt +Πt + (dh,t−1 + bt−1) rt−1 + df,t−1r∗t−1 − Tt.
Let Ξt,t+1 ≡ βt,t+1 (ct+1−hct)
−σ−βt+1,t+2h(ct+2−hct+1)−σ
(ct−hct−1)−σ−βt,t+1h(ct+1−hct)−σ be the stochastic discount factor. The first-order
conditions for the household problem are fairly standard:
wt (1− τw,t) = χl
ϕ
t
(ct − hct−1)−σ − βt,t+1h (ct+1 − hct)−σ
,
Et [Ξt,t+1rt] = 1, (3.1)
Et [Ξt,t+1r∗t ] = 1. (3.2)
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 imply that the risk free rate is equalized across countries thanks to deposit market
integration.
3.2.2 Non-financial firms
There are two types of non-financial firms: capital producers and goods producers.
3.2.2.1 Goods producers
Goods producers hire workers and purchase capital from capital producers to produce final goods that are
homogeneous across countries. They operate in markets for goods, capital, and labour that are perfectly
competitive. The production technology is a standard Cobb-Douglas function yt = At (ξtkt−1)α l1−αt
where α is the capital share, At is total factor productivity, and kt is the capital stock at the end of period
t. Using δ to denote the depreciation rate, and ξt to govern the quality of capital, a goods producer
acquires additional capital it = kt − (1− δ) ξtkt−1 at a given price qt. To finance its physical investment,
the goods producer borrows from banks by issuing securities
qst,t (st − st−1) = itqt, (3.3)
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where st denotes the number of securities issued at the end of period t and qsT,t is the period T price of
security issued at period t. Each security is a state-contingent claim to the future return from one unit of
investment: zt+1, (1− δ) ξt+1zt+2, (1− δ)2 ξt+1ξt+2zt+3, ... with zt denoting the gross profit per unit of
capital.
The problem faced by the representative goods producer is
max{lt+j ,kt+j ,st+j}∞j=0 Et
∑∞
j=0 Ξt,t+j
× [(1− τy,t) yt+j − wt+j lt+j − it+jqt+j + qst+j,t+j (st+j − st+j−1)− zt+jst+j−1] ,
subject to equation 3.3, the production function, and the capital accumulation equation. τy,t is a sales tax.
Let the multiplier associated with equation 3.3 be λnft , the first-order conditions for the goods producer’s
problem are then
wt = (1− α) yt (1− τy,t)
lt
,
qt
(
1 + λnft
)
= EtΞt,t+1
[
∂yt+1
∂kt
+ (1− δ) ξt+1qt+1
(
1 + λnft+1
)]
, (3.4)
qst
(
1 + λnft
)
= EtΞt,t+1
[
zt+1 + qst+1
(
1 + λnft+1
)]
. (3.5)
It is important to assume that investment is fully financed by securities, i.e., λnft ̸= 0. Otherwise, firms
can effectively borrow directly from households by paying a negative dividend, which makes the banking
sector trivial. Using equations 3.4 and 3.5, it is easy to show that the time T price of security issued
at time t is qsT,t = qT (1− δ)T
∏T
j=1 ξt+j , and st = kt, given s0 = k0. I can define the return of holding
security issued in period t from t to t+ 1 as
rk,t+1 =
zt+1 + (1− δ) ξt+1qt+1
qt
,
where the gross profit per unit of capital is obtained using the zero profit condition
zt =
yt − wtlt
kt−1
= αyt (1− τy,t)
kt−1
.
3.2.2.2 Capital producers
Given the demand for new capital it and the market price qt, capital producers maximize their expected
profit discounted by the household’s stochastic discount factor
max
{it+j}∞j=0
Et
∞∑
j=0
Ξt,t+j [qt+jit+j − f (kt+j−1, it+j)] ,
subject to the cost function
f (·) = it + η2
(
it
δkt−1
− 1
)2
δkt−1,
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where η ≥ 0. The first-order condition for the production decision pins down the market price of new
capital
qt = 1 + η
(
it
δkt−1
− 1
)
.
3.2.3 Banks
Banks receive deposits amounting to dh,t and d∗h,t from domestic and foreign depositors, respectively,
and purchase sh,t and sf,t units of securities from domestic and foreign goods producers. The lending
channel from banks to goods producers is frictionless. If banks have difficulty raising deposits, they have
the option of borrowing dg,t from the central bank’s discount window at the interest rate rg,t, or they
may receive equity injections from their government. By holding long-term risky securities funded by
short-term risk free deposits, banks in this model act as investment banks as well as commercial banks,
which is a stylized fact of the recent financial crisis. For the same reason, the literature often refers to
such banks as financial intermediaries.
The balance sheet of a representative bank is given by
ωt ≡ qtsh,t + q∗t sf,t = dh,t + d∗h,t + dg,t + eh,t + eg,t, (3.6)
where ωt denotes the total assets of the bank, and eh,t and eg,t are equity held by households and the
government, respectively. Total bank profits, referred to as net worth nt, is given by
eh,t + eg,t = nt ≡ qt−1sh,t−1rk,t + q∗t−1sf,t−1r∗k,t − dh,t−1rt−1 − d∗h,t−1r∗t−1 − dg,t−1rg,t−1. (3.7)
I refer to deposits and household equity as private funds and refer to discount window lending and
government equity as public funds. Bank leverage may be defined as assets financed by deposits and
private equity divided by private equity
φt =
ωt − dg,t − eg,t
eh,t
.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), I assume that the bank shuts down with probability rn,t at the
end of each period and will distribute its net worth evenly to all equity. The probability of shutting down
can be exogenous stochastic. Then, the banker becomes a worker. In the meantime, a similar number of
workers from the same household randomly become new bankers. New bankers receive “start-up” funds
from their household at a proportion ϖ of the total assets owned by a representative incumbent plus
the value of the central bank’s asset purchase program.9 The probability of a shutdown has two roles.
First, an infinitely lived bank will sooner or later accumulate enough net worth to finance its investment
without borrowing from households. In this case, the financial constraint that I will detail shortly plays
no role. Second, the probability enters the bank’s stochastic discount factor, which ensures that the
bank is always “less patient” than households so that funds always flow from households to banks. The
9As I will show in impulse responses, a central bank’s asset purchase crowds out banks. I assume the value of the
government’s asset purchase program enters here so that these purchases do not lead to fewer start-up funds received by
new banks. If the start-up funds can be interpreted as new equity, data shows counter-cyclical and positively skewed equity
issuance. However, there is no evidence suggesting that equity issuance should be affected by, and only by, asset purchase
policy. Therefore this assumption ensures that public asset purchases do not suffer from artificial disadvantage comparing
to other policies.
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notation of rn,t follows the suggestion of Swarbrick et al. (2017) that the probability of shutting down
can be interpreted as an exogenous dividend rate.
The bank chooses sh,t, sf,t, dh,t, d∗h,t, and dg,t, given prices and rates of returns, to maximize the
expected present value of net worth paid upon closure
Vt (nt) = maxEt
∞∑
j=0
rn,t+j,t+j (1− rn,t,t+j−1) Ξt,t+j+1 (nt+1+j)
= maxEtΞt,t+1 [rn,t,tnt+1 + (1− rn,t,t)Vt+1 (nt+1)]
= νn,tnt, (3.8)
where the third equality follows a conjecture that the value function is linear in net worth and (1− rn,i,j)
is the probability that the bank operates until the end of period j conditional on the bank operating at
the beginning of period i. The bank’s ability to raise deposits is restricted up to an incentive constraint
(or financial constraint)
OBCt ≡ νn,t (nt − eg,t)− [θt (ωt − θgdg,t)− νn,teg,t] ≥ 0 (3.9)
where OBCt stands for an occasionally binding constraint and measures the distance of this constraint
from binding, θt ∈ [0, 1] is exogenous stochastic, and θg ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter. The intuition behind
this constraint is the following. Banks are able to declare bankruptcy and exit. In this case, the banker
diverts to his or her family a proportion θt of the divertable assets, ωt − θgdg,t, minus government equity.
The creditors can reclaim only the un-diverted funds. Therefore, creditors are willing to lend to a bank
only if the bank has no incentive to default, i.e., the value of the private equity is larger than the value of
default. The fact that θgdg,t is un-divertable and government equity are fully secured indicates that the
central bank has superior power to enforce repayment.
For convenience, the decision on sh,t and sf,t can be written in terms of the total assets ωt and
the portfolio αp,t = q
∗
t sf,t
ωt
. Denoting the multiplier associated with inequality 3.9 by λt ≥ 0, the
necessary conditions of the maximization include the slackness condition of inequality 3.9, and the
first-order conditions with respect to the total assets (ωt), the portfolio (αp,t), and the borrowing from
the government (dg,t)
EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1) (rk,t+1 − rt) ≡ νω,t
= λt1+λt θt
, (3.10)
EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1)
(
rk,t+1 − r∗k,t+1
)
≡ ναp,t
= 0
, (3.11)
EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1) (rg,t − rt) ≡ νdg,t
= λt1+λt θtθg
, (3.12)
where in equation 3.10 I use the fact that ναp,t = 0 for all t thanks to market integration. Given νn,t+1 ≥ 1,
the extra term (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1) multiplying the stochastic discount factor suggests that banks
are generally less patient than households. The unknown time-varying coefficient in the value function
can be solved using the first-order conditions and the financial constraint:
νn,t = νt
(
νω,t
θt − νω,t + 1
)
, (3.13)
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where νt ≡ EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1) rt is defined similarly to νω,t, ναp,t, and νdg,t. Because
νn,t is independent of the bank’s decision variables, equation 3.13 verifies the earlier conjecture that the
value function is linear.
The properties of the bank’s problem have been well discussed in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) . Here
I only underline some key results related to the occasionally binding constraint. To begin, use equations
3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 to write the value function as
νn,tnt = νω,tωt − ναp,tωtαp,t − νdg,tdg,t + νtnt.
Then, νn,t, νω,t, ναp,t, νdg,t, νt can be conveniently interpreted as the expected marginal value of net
worth, total assets, portfolio, borrowing from the government, and deposits, respectively. If the financial
constraint is not binding, then λt = 0 and the first-order conditions imply that having one extra unit
of ωt by borrowing from households or the government does not raise the bank’s value. In addition,
equation 3.13 becomes νn,t = νt ≈ 1, meaning that net worth and deposits are equally valued at the
margin. If the financial constraint is binding, λt > 0 implies νω,t > 0, νdg,t > 0, and νn,t > νt. Securities,
borrowing from the government, and equity are more valuable than deposits because they also help relax
the financial constraint. In addition, νω,t > 0 indicates a credit spread between returns on securities and
returns on deposits. The spread, spreadt ≡ Et (rk,t+1 − rt), is a convenient measure of financial friction.
Note that, unless the model is solved with certainty equivalence, the spread is positive even when the
financial constraint is not binding. Positive spread suggests insufficient investment due to imperfect
financial intermediation. So the economy subject to the financial friction is too small relative to the one
subject to no such friction, i.e., the social optimum.
3.2.4 Government and unconventional policies
Following the standard approach in the public finance literature, the specific agency that implements the
unconventional policies is abstracted in the model. The consolidated government budget is given by
Gt + Γi,t + rtBt−1 +APi,t = Tt + τw,twtLt + τy,tYt +Bt + Li,t,
where Gt and Tt are lump-sum government spending and tax, respectively, Bt are government bonds, Γi,t,
APi,t, and Li,t are resource costs, aggregate spending, and the gross profit of unconventional policy. The
government can provide liquidity to the economy in three ways, namely, public asset purchases, lending
to banks, and equity injections, indexed by i = 1, 2, 3. The aggregate spending is therefore the total
asset purchased, the total discount window lending, and the value of government equity, respectively. All
policies can be financed by government bonds (or reserves, the liabilities of the central bank), a lump-sum
tax, a labour income tax, or a sales tax. As argued in Del Negro and Sims (2015), in order to avoid
central bank insolvency, it would be appropriate for a central bank conducting unconventional policies to
receive fiscal backing from the fiscal authority. I now proceed to describe each policy.
Using public asset purchases, the government lends directly to domestic goods producers.10 I assume
that the government does not purchase foreign securities for political reasons or due to a very high cost
of evaluation and monitoring.11 The government acts like a financial intermediary but faces no constraint
in addition to its budget. By reducing the amount of securities available on the market, the policy
pushes up asset prices and gives banks a capital gain. The policy also relaxes the constraint 3.9. As
alternative policies, the government can provide liquidities to banks. Replacing one unit of deposits by
10Quint and Rabanal (2017) show how the model can be modified slightly such that the asset purchases are applied to
long-term government bonds. These modifications should not change the main implications of this chapter.
11There is a natural upper bound that the government cannot buy more assets than those available on the market. We
are unlikely to hit this bound with reasonable calibration.
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one unit of government lending12 relaxes the financial constraint, thanks to the government’s superior
power of enforcement. Consequently, the banks can expand their investment to the extent allowed by
the relaxed financial constraint. Government equity stabilises the financial sector in a similar way. The
constraint-relaxing effect of one unit of equity, held either by households or the government, is multiplied
by the marginal value of net worth νn,t, which is high in a financial crisis. While private equity can only
be accumulated slowly, the stock of government equity is freely adjustable.
As the government collects tax from households and provides liquidity to banks or goods producers,
unconventional policy serves as a bypass for the financial friction between households and banks. Then
the optimal policy problem can be interpreted as the optimal size of the government’s balance sheet
relative to that of banks given some policy cost and the fact that the economy exits from unconventional
policy in the long-run. Clearly, these three policies may work against each other. For example, banks
that receive equity injections would wish to expand their asset holding. However, they may not able to
do so if the government also conducts a large scale asset purchase program. In this chapter, I consider
one policy at a time.
Before proceeding, I briefly compare the policies discussed above to those in the literature. I model
public asset purchases and lending to banks following Gertler and Karadi (2011), but I model equity
injections differently. Gertler and Karadi (2011) assume that a unit of government equity has the same
payout stream as a unit of security. The government is willing to pay a higher price than the prevailing
market price of securities. They also assumed that government equity is non-divertable. Due to these
assumptions, equity injections are effectively public asset purchases with a lump-sum transfer to banks,
and hence, they have very similar effects on the economy. By contrast, I assume that government equity
are identical to private equity in nature, which makes this policy similar to its counterpart in He and
Krishnamurthy (2013). Negro et al. (2017) consider two types of assets. The private assets are illiquid
and can be sold up to a certain fraction of holding in each period. Government bonds and money, on the
other hand, are liquid and not subject to this constraint. Therefore, the unconventional policy in their
paper is to sell liquid assets and buy illiquid assets, roughly in line with the evolution of the asset side of
the Federal Reserve balance sheet during the crisis. Illiquid assets are similar to securities in this chapter.
Thus, the asset swap policy in Negro et al. (2017) can be seen as a mix of discount window lending and
public asset purchases in this chapter.
So far, using unconventional policy is costless to the economy. Any level of interventions between just
offsetting the financial friction and fully crowding out private funds is equally optimal. In the literature,
policy costs are either abstracted in the analysis (Negro et al., 2017; Quint and Rabanal, 2017) or modeled
in a reduced form (Dedola et al., 2013; Foerster, 2015; Gertler and Karadi, 2011). To the best of my
knowledge, there is only one paper (Kandrac, 2014) that attempts to evaluate the potential costs of
the Fed’s QE in the sense that the Federal Reserve, as a dominant buyer, may deteriorate the financial
market functioning. To form policy trade-offs, I follow the literature in the main text and assume that
the government must pay a reduced form resource cost on its holding of securities, equity, and its lending
to banks:
Γi,t = τAP 2i,t. (3.14)
This cost represents inefficient public activism in private financial markets or the cost of strengthened
financial surveillance.13 Then the policy trade-offs are between efficient financial intermediation and
12The policy I refer to as discount window lending can also be interpreted as the ECB’s longer-term refinancing operations.
13Dedola et al. (2013) also add a linear term to the cost but they only find the coefficient on the quadratic term playing an
important role. In my context, the linear term implies a positive marginal cost regardless of the level of intervention so the
Ramsey policy is nonzero even when the financial constraints are not binding. So I choose to make the cost pure quadratic.
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GDP losses. To facilitate a comparison across policies, I assume the same τ for each policy. However,
we should keep in mind that the intervention costs are arguably smaller for high-grade instruments like
commercial papers, agency debt and mortgage backed securities (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). Sensitivity
of the optimal policy to this cost will be discussed in section 3.5.
In appendix C.3, I consider the policy cost as a distorting effect of the tax that is necessary to finance
at least a proportion of the policy spending. The trade-off is between efficient financial intermediation
and inefficient labour market (if the tax is a labour income tax). I conclude that the distortionary tax is
too expensive to finance the unconventional policy. A comprehensive investigation of how unconventional
policy is financed and the associated costs is left for future work.
3.2.5 Aggregation and the market clearing conditions
The law of motion for the aggregate equity held by households is given by
Eh,t =
Eh,t−1
Eh,t−1 + Eg,t−1
(1− rn,t,t)
(
qt−1Sh,t−1rk,t + q∗t−1Sf,t−1r∗k,t −Dh,t−1rt−1 −D∗h,t−1r∗t−1 −Dg,t−1rg,t−1
)
+ ϖ (ωt−1 +AP1,t−1) ,
where the last term is the start-up funds received by new banks. Finally, the model is closed by market
clearing conditions on the goods and security markets
Yt + Y ∗t = Ct + C∗t +Gt +G∗t + Γt + Γ∗t + f (Kt−1, It) + f
(
K∗t−1, I
∗
t
)
,
qtSt = qt
(
Sh,t + S∗h,t
)
+AP1,t,
q∗t S
∗
t = q∗t
(
Sf,t + S∗f,t
)
+AP ∗1,t.
3.3 The numerical method
3.3.1 Simulation method
3.3.1.1 Dealing with the occasionally binding constraints (OBCs)
Stochastic models with OBCs are typically simulated using global methods. However, the model I describe
above and the corresponding model to solve the Ramsey policy contain too many state variables to
be solved even by methods that are explicitly designed to deal with large state spaces, such as that of
Maliar and Maliar (2015). Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2015) provide a fast algorithm based on piecewise
linearization which, however, gives certainty equivalent results. I employ the approach proposed by
Holden (2016a,b). This approach supports second-order approximation to evaluate welfare and captures
the risk of the constraint binding in the future. DynareOBC14 created by the same author is a toolkit
to implement this approach, which roughly consists of the following steps. First, the model is Taylor
approximated up to a chosen order around the deterministic steady state. All inequalities are ignored
during the approximation, but enter the approximated model. Then, the approximated model with OBCs
can be solved under perfect foresight using Holden (2016b)’s algorithm. We can simulate a stochastic
version of the model using the idea of the extended path (EP) algorithm of Fair and Taylor (1983). For a
model that is linear apart from the OBCs (due to first-order approximation), the simulation is certainty
equivalent. For a model that is non-linear apart from the OBCs (due to higher-order approximation),
the simulation captures the risk stemming from non-OBC nonlinearity so that the slopes of variables’
responses change at the bound. To further capture the risk of hitting the bound in the future, Holden
14DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.50132.
3.3 The numerical method 59
Table 3.1: Parameterization
Description Parameter Value
Steady-state discount factor β¯ 0.99
Elasticity of discount factor ψβ -0.001
Habit h 0.815
Risk aversion σ 1.5
Weight on disutility of labour χ 3.4
Inverse elasticity of labour supply ϕ 0.276
Capital share α 0.33
Inverse elasticity of investment to the capital price η 1.728
Depreciation rate δ 0.025
Steady-state survival probability of banks 1− r¯n 0.972
Transfer rate from households to new banks ϖ 0.0045
Steady-state fraction of divertable assets θ¯ 0.2457
Fraction of un-divertable discount window borrowing θg 1
Reduced form policy costs τ 0.0001
Persistence of financial shock ρθ 0.8
Standard deviation of financial shock σθ 0.1
Persistence of capital quality shock ρξ 0.66
Standard deviation of capital quality shock σξ 0.05
Persistence of productivity shock ρA 0.95
Standard deviation of productivity shock σA 0.0044
(2016a) applies a modified version of the stochastic extended path (SEP) algorithm of Adjemian and
Juillard (2013). To form expectations, the SEP algorithm involves integrating the model over a certain
number of periods of future uncertainty. I integrate over 50 periods and find no considerable change from
integrating over longer periods. I refer to the solutions based on the EP and the SEP algorithm as EP
alike and SEP alike solutions, respectively. I will compare these two solutions to show the precautionary
motives to avoid the bound.
3.3.1.2 Dealing with the indeterminate portfolio
An issue related to the perturbation based method is indeterminacy of the equilibrium portfolio αp,t.
According to Devereux and Sutherland (2011), a second (third, fourth, ...) order approximation of the
model is generally enough to pin down up to zero (first, second, ...) order term(s) of the portfolio, while
up to the first (second, third, ...) order terms of the portfolio are relevant for the second (third, fourth,
...) order approximated model. The zero-order term is the deterministic steady state. Devereux and
Sutherland (2011) propose a general solution as follows. Conjecturing αp,t as a (N-1)th order polynomial
of the model’s state variables, we can use this conjecture to replace equation 3.11. Then, we can simulate
the Nth order approximated model and search for parameters in the conjecture such that the (N+1)th
order approximation of equation 3.11 is satisfied.
As in Dedola et al. (2013), I only solve the zero-order portfolio. This is sufficient when I focus on
dynamics and calculate a first-order approximation to the model. In the evaluation of welfare, the
first-order terms of the portfolio are neglected as it is very demanding to compute portfolio dynamics in a
model with OBCs.
3.3.2 Parameterization
Table 3.1 shows the parameterization of the economy based on the second-order approximated model
where no policy is employed. The behaviour of such a economy is reported in appendix C.2. The
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quantitative results are similar to that of Dedola et al. (2013). However, I show in the next section how
the OBC setting matters for the optimal policy.
Parameters concerning the non-financial sector are standard in the literature and are borrowed from
Dedola et al. (2013). I depart from the literature by choosing a steady state in which the financial
constraints are slack.15 The constraints may bind endogenously due to adverse shocks. I define a financial
crisis as the occasion when the financial constraints are tight such that the credit spread is two standard
deviations above its mean. Since 1983 in the U.S., this definition corresponds to the early 21st century
recession and the 2007 - 2008 financial crisis. The unconditional probability of a financial crisis is 5.28%
under my calibration.
There are three parameters in the financial sector. Following Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), I choose a
survival rate implying that, on average, bankers survive for around 8 years. Next, I set the steady-state
leverage ratio to 4. Given that the financial constraint is slack in the steady state, this pins down
ϖ =
(
1− 1−r¯n
β¯
)
/φ¯. The steady-state proportion of divertable assets θ¯ is chosen such that the financial
constraint is close to being binding in the steady state.
There are three exogenous variables in each country, namely productivity, At, capital quality, ξt, and
the fraction of divertable assets, θt. Each of them follows an uncorrelated AR(1) process. Parameters for
the productivity are taken from the estimate of Heathcote and Perri (2002). Parameters for the capital
quality follow Gertler et al. (2012), the working paper version of which provides the microfoundations in its
appendix. I choose a standard deviation of θt to make the mean of the annualized spread about 2.35%.16
However, without features such as liquidity premia and true default risk,17 I inevitably overestimate the
standard deviation of the spread. Or I would underestimate the spread mean if I calibrated the model to
match the standard deviation.
As a robustness check, I also consider other relevant calibrations. For example, in an alternative
parameterization, r¯n is set to match a dividend rate of 5.15% made by the largest 20 U.S. banks during
1965–2013.18 Quint and Rabanal (2017) use GMM to estimate a similar model with nominal frictions, a
Taylor rule, and an always binding financial constraint. They find a much larger steady-state leverage of
16. This is probably not very surprising as Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) consider the leverage of 4 as an
average across sectors with vastly different financial structures. All alternative calibrations change my
results quantitatively but do not change the main conclusions.
There are two policy-related parameters. For the proportion of un-divertable discount window lending,
I consider two values. When θg = 1, discount window lending cannot be diverted. This choice makes
the three policies more comparable because the funds of the two other policies are effectively also non-
divertable. However, as noted by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), there is likely to be a capacity constraint
on the central bank’s ability to retrieve funds. Interest rate data of the ECB’s longer-term refinancing
operations is higher than the rate banks can borrow, which also suggests θg < 1. Thus, I assume θg = 0.8.
The second policy parameter is the intervention cost, τ . Since it is difficult to measure the inefficiency of
15With integrated security markets and a steady state in which the financial constraints are not binding, there is
indeterminacy between the bank’s total assets, ωt and ω∗t . To pin down these variables, it is sufficient to introduce an asset
adjustment cost to the bank’s balance sheet:
ψω
2
(ωt +AP1,t − SteadyState)2 ,
where ψω = 10−5 in practice.
16This figure is calculated from quarterly data of Moody’s seasoned Bbb corporate bond yield relative to the yield on
10-year treasury constant maturity, 1983q1-2017q1, retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. By contrast,
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Dedola et al. (2013) use 1%, which is roughly the mean of Moody’s seasoned Aaa corporate
bond yield relative to the yield on 10-year treasury constant maturity.
17Recently Gertler et al. (2017) are working on a similar model where banks can default on their debts possibly due to a
bank run.
18This number is calculated by Swarbrick et al. (2017) using the Baron (2017) dataset.
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public activism in private financial markets, I set it to a number small enough to allow me to focus on
the benefits of interventions. I consider larger intervention costs in section 3.5.
3.4 The Ramsey cooperative policy
In this section, I focus on a benchmark case in which the Home and Foreign governments conduct
cooperative policy, and the policy is financed by government bonds (or equivalently a lump-sum tax) and
only entails small reduced form cost.
The government in each country jointly maximizes a single objective function - the life-time utilities
averaged across countries - by committing to a state-contingent plan of one of the three policies discussed
previously. Policy makers solve the following problem:
minWELg ≡
−Et
∑∞
j=t β
g
t,t+j
1
2
[
(ct+j−hct+j−1)1−σ
1−σ − χ
l1+ϕ
t+j
1+ϕ +
(c∗t+j−hc∗t+j−1)1−σ
1−σ − χ
l∗1+ϕ
t+j
1+ϕ
]
subject to all the equilibrium conditions of private agents,19 where βgt,t+1 is identical to the households’
discount factor. In solving for the optimal policy, I follow the “timeless” perspective advocated by
Woodford (2003). However, the resulting system is very difficult to simulate when I employ the SEP alike
solution. Thanks to the small policy cost, I can approximate the true Ramsey problem arbitrarily well by
a slightly simplified problem. Specifically, I make the following assumption
ASSUMPTION 1: The governments conduct policy subject to λt = λ∗t = 0, instead of λt ≥ 0 and
λ∗t ≥ 0.
According to equation 3.10, the positive multiplier implies a positive spread. In the true Ramsey
problem, the governments can tolerate positive spreads (roughly at 10−6 given my main calibration) to
the extent that the marginal benefits of reducing the spreads equal the marginal costs of interventions.
Hence, we have limτ→0+ λt = limτ→0+ λ∗t = 0 in the Ramsey equilibrium, which justifies assumption 1
when τ is small. The qualitative results in this section remain unchanged if I do not make assumption 1.
3.4.1 Impulse response analysis
Following the literature, I consider policy responses to two shocks. First, I consider a negative capital
quality shock ξt in Home. The impacts of this shock can be decomposed into two stages. In the first stage,
this shock has real impacts similar to those of a productivity shock. Specifically, the return on securities
is low, which reduces the banks’ net worth by a multiplier of their leverage. Consequently, the financial
constraints may be binding and the second stage “financial accelerator” effects take place. In this case,
banks must firesell their assets. Since banks take asset prices as given, it is their externality that the
firesale depresses asset prices and further impairs their net worth. As a result, the financial constraint
binds even tighter. In the second stage, banks are inefficient financial intermediaries. The second shock
θt , referred to as a financial shock, tightens the financial constraints directly (Dedola and Lombardo,
2012; Negro et al., 2017; Perri and Quadrini, 2011), and hence, only has the second-stage effects. How
the economy responds to these shocks under no policy intervention can be found in appendix C.2.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the one standard deviation impulse responses for three variables, namely
banks’ assets financed by private funds, private equity, and policy spending as a fraction of domestic
asset value. Other variables are not shown because they behave as if there were no financial constraint,
19These conditions include two inequalities, λt ≥ 0, OBCt ≥ 0, a slackness condition λtOBCt = 0, and their Foreign
counterparts. It can be verified that λt ≥ 0 is a redundant constraint. Intuitively, λt ≥ 0 roughly implies rk,t+1 − rt ≥ 0
according to equation 3.10, which a benevolent policy maker would never violate.
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Figure 3.1: Cooperative policies under Home capital quality shock
Figure 3.2: Cooperative policies under Home financial shock
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i.e., like the black broken lines in Figures C.1 and C.2 in the appendix. The results obtained with public
asset purchases, discount window lending, equity injections, and no policy are shown in red, blue, green,
and black, respectively.
By design, all unconventional polices address only the second stage effect of a shock. They share
two common roles. First, policy provides public funds to the economy when banks are constrained to
borrow from households and hence are constrained to lend. The public funds push up asset prices, give
banks a capital gain and improve their balance sheet. This effect undo the bank’s externality. Therefore,
upon the impact of a shock, the losses on net worth is smaller under policy interventions than the case in
which there is no intervention, as shown by the middle column of the figures. All policies imply the same
path of private equity because public equity, discount window lending, and securities (purchased by the
government as an opportunity cost for banks) are equally valued when the financial constraints do not or
just bind.
On the other hand, however, the left column suggests that public funds crowd out private funds.
This crowding-out effect results in slow growth of private equity. To stabilize the financial sector, the
government must also exit slowly from the policy until banks accumulate enough private equity. The
exit path needs to be consistent with the path of deleveraging. Evidently, the crowding-out effect
is much smaller under equity injections than under the other two policies. This difference must be
explained by the fact that, given equity injections, banks can raise more deposits thanks to more relaxed
financial constraints. The second role of policy is to relax the financial constraint 3.9, which reduces
the crowding-out effect. The smaller crowding-out effect allows banks to depend less on policy so less
interventions are required.
To summarise, Equity injections clearly constitute the most efficient policy. Discount window lending
is at most as efficient as public asset purchases in the extreme case of θg = 1. The fact that it is hard to
tell in prior which policy has smaller crowding-out effect makes the analysis in this section nontrivial
even under assumption 3.4.
On the international dimension, the policy responses are asymmetric. Following a Home capital
quality shock, Foreign interventions are roughly half as strong as Home interventions. This is because
banks hold a portfolio that consists of more domestic assets (αp = 0.4). Since Home banks are more
affected by the shock, they benefit more from the purchases of Home assets. However, discount window
lending and equity injections are not immune to this portfolio effect and these two policies affect the
whole portfolio by design. Following a Home financial shock, however, Foreign need not intervene at all.20
A financial shock does not have the first-stage real impacts. Foreign banks would only be affected by
depressed asset prices worldwide if there were no policy response. Home interventions fully stabilize asset
prices in both countries so the Foreign country can enjoy a free ride.
3.4.2 Precautionary effects and the exit from policy
I have argued that the exit from policy must in line with the speed of deleveraging. To be more specific,
the exit must be slower due to a precautionary effect arising from the future risk of binding financial
constraints. In figure 3.3, I compare the EP alike solution (black broken lines) and the SEP alike solution
(coloured solid lines) of the impulse responses to a Home financial shock. The SEP alike solution is
also employed in the previous subsection. If no risk of future bonding constraints is taken into account,
unconventional policy ends in the same period when the economy escapes from the financial constraint. By
contrast, if this risk is predicted by both private agents and the government, the policy is precautionary in
the sense that it is relatively stable and persistent even when the economy has escaped from the constraint
sooner than in the former case. Intuitively, the policy should give some precautionary protection to the
20Without assumption 1, foreign interventions approach zero as the policy cost approaches zero
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Figure 3.3: Cooperative policies with and without precautionary effects
Note: Coloured solid lines are SEP alike results and black broken lines are EP alike results.
economy for a few periods after a crisis, during which the banks, though having enough net worth to
escape from the financial constraints, are vulnerable to another adverse shock.
In models where there are true default risks and bank runs, such as those of Coimbra and Rey (2017)
and Gertler et al. (2017), the precautionary effects are arguably stronger and hence the exit from policy
is slower.
3.5 The Ramsey noncooperative policy
Without international cooperation, everything else in the cooperative policy problem applies, but each
government now maximizes domestic welfare using domestic instruments, taking the entire path of foreign
instruments as given. The equilibrium is an outcome of an open-loop dynamic Nash game. Following
Coenen et al. (2007), taking the entire path of foreign instruments as given is an unrealistic assumption
but a necessary simplification to the problem. Since policy cost plays an important role in noncooperative
policy, it is important not to make assumption 1, which only provides reasonable approximation to
the true Ramsey problem when the cost approaching zero. However, without assumption 1, I can only
simulate the model reasonably fast with the EP alike solution. I confine my discussion to the most
efficient policy, equity injections. Other policies generate similar results.
As shown in figures 3.4 and 3.5, the noncooperative equilibrium is identical to the cooperative
equilibrium when the unconventional policy is very cheap to use (τ = 0.0001). Increasing τ makes
it favourable to share the intervention cost across countries. Given a Home shock, this means fewer
interventions by the Home government and more by the Foreign government, which results in higher
credit spreads globally. However, after a certain point, further increasing τ affects the noncooperative
policy more than the cooperative policy, and the cooperation gain becomes a positive number. The
tipping point is about τ = 0.01 for the capital quality shock and about τ = 0.001 for the financial
shock. Under a Home shock, the noncooperative equilibrium features excessive interventions in Foreign
and insufficient interventions in Home. The consequences of noncooperation for credit spreads also
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Figure 3.4: Noncooperative policy responses to a Home capital quality shock
Note: The cooperative equilibrium is shown in red solid lines, and the noncooperative equilibrium is
shown in black broken lines.
Figure 3.5: Noncooperative policy responses to a Home financial shock
Note: The cooperative equilibrium is shown in red solid lines, and the noncooperative equilibrium is
shown in black broken lines.
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depend on the shock. Under a capital quality shock, the spreads are higher and more persistent in the
noncooperative equilibrium than in the cooperative equilibrium. Under a financial shock, however, the
noncooperative policy achieves smaller spreads in the short run. My results are similar to the results of
the optimal noncooperative simple rule studied in Dedola et al. (2013) but different in the following ways.
In their paper, increasing τ always reduces the policy responses in both countries. After a certain point,
policy responses in the noncooperative equilibrium quickly approaching zero in both countries. Further
increasing the cost also makes even policy responses in cooperative equilibrium equal to zero. By contrast,
in my context, policy responses are re-balanced across countries to tackle the increase in the cost.
3.6 Conclusions
I study the Ramsey optimal unconventional monetary policy in a two-country version of Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), with and without cross-country policy cooperation. The main findings are threefold.
First, I suggest that unconventional policy should be designed to address the financial constraint that
banks face. Second, after giving a strong initial response, the central bank should exit slowly from the
policy even after a financial crisis has passed. Third, if cross-country policy cooperation is not imposed,
the interventions are too strong in one country and too weak in the other. The cooperation gain is zero if
the intervention cost is small. Increasing the intervention cost to a certain point lets the cooperation gain
positive.
Naturally, this chapter is subject to several limitations. On one hand, this chapter focuses on the
capital gain channel to keep the problems at hand relatively simple. Section 3.1 discuss many other
possible channels. These channels may open for some but not all unconventional policies. For instance,
forward guidance works mainly through the signalling channel. One important channel missing in this
chapter is the bank’s lending channel. In my model, there is no friction between banks and non-financial
firms. Reducing credit spread automatically boosts lending and investment. This is not necessarily true
in data according to Chakraborty et al. (2017) and Acharya et al. (2017). Thus we need better capture
banks’ behaviours and their heterogeneity. Nonetheless, I expect that the main conclusions of this chapter
can be generalized to a more sophisticated model. On the other hand, following the literature, I assume a
reduced form cost for the unconventional policy. The cost of the unconventional policy, while critical
to the optimal policy analysis, is still little understood. A recent paper by Kandrac (2014) summarises
several potential costs that have been discussed in the Federal Reserve. These costs introduce new policy
trade-offs and may make new implications for optimal policy.
Appendix C
C.1 Equilibrium conditions
Competitive equilibrium conditions are given as follows. The cooperative and non-cooperative opti-
mal policy equilibrium conditions are generated automatically by a Matlab routine using competitive
equilibrium conditions as constraints.
External discount factors:
βt,t+1 = β¯ + ψβ log
(
Ct
Yt
)
,
β∗t,t+1 = β¯ + ψβ log
(
C∗t
Y ∗t
)
.
Euler equations:
Et [Ξt,t+1rt] = 1,
Et [Ξt,t+1r∗t ] = 1,
Et
[
Ξ∗t,t+1r∗t
]
= 1.
Households’ budget constraint:
Ct +Dh,t +Bt +Df,t = (1− τw,t)wtLt + (Dh,t−1 +Bt−1) rt−1 +Df,t−1r∗t−1 +Πt − Tt.
Labour supply:
wt (1− τw,t) = χL
ϕ
t
(Ct − hCt−1)−σ − βt,t+1h (Ct+1 − hCt)−σ
,
w∗t
(
1− τ∗w,t
)
= χL
∗ϕ
t(
C∗t − hC∗t−1
)−σ − β∗t,t+1h (C∗t+1 − hC∗t )−σ .
Goods production functions:
Yt = At (ξtKt−1)α L1−αt ,
Y ∗t = A∗t
(
ξ∗tK
∗
t−1
)α
L∗1−αt .
Labour demand equations:
wt = (1− α) Yt (1− τy,t)
Lt
,
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w∗t = (1− α)
Y ∗t
(
1− τ∗y,t
)
L∗t
.
Zero profit conditions of goods producers:
Yt = ztKt−1 + wtLt,
Y ∗t = z∗tK∗t−1 + w∗tL∗t .
Capital accumulation:
Kt = It + (1− δ) ξtKt−1,
K∗t = I∗t + (1− δ) ξ∗tK∗t−1.
Long-term asset returns:
rk,t+1 =
zt+1 + (1− δ) ξt+1qt+1
qt
,
r∗k,t+1 =
z∗t+1 + (1− δ) ξ∗t+1q∗t+1
q∗t
.
Determination of asset prices:
qt = 1 + η
(
It
δKt−1
− 1
)
,
q∗t = 1 + η
(
I∗t
δK∗t−1
− 1
)
.
Marginal value of banks’ assets:
EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1) (rk,t+1 − rt) ≡ νω,t
= λt1+λt θt
,
EtΞ∗t,t+1
(
r∗n,t,t +
(
1− r∗n,t,t
)
ν∗n,t+1
) (
r∗k,t+1 − r∗t
)
≡ ν∗ω,t
= λ
∗
t
1+λ∗t
θ∗t
.
Marginal value of discount window lending:
EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1) (rg,t − rt) ≡ νdg,t
= λt1+λt θtθg
,
EtΞ∗t,t+1
(
r∗n,t,t +
(
1− r∗n,t,t
)
ν∗n,t+1
) (
r∗g,t − r∗t
) ≡ ν∗dg,t
= λ
∗
t
1+λ∗t
θ∗t θ
∗
g
.
Marginal value of deposits:
νt ≡ EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1) rt,
ν∗t ≡ EtΞ∗t,t+1
(
r∗n,t,t +
(
1− r∗n,t,t
)
ν∗n,t+1
)
r∗t .
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Marginal value of net worth:
νn,t = νt
(
νω,t
θt − νω,t + 1
)
,
ν∗n,t = ν∗t
(
ν∗ω,t
θ∗t − ν∗ω,t
+ 1
)
.
International arbitrage of long-term assets:
EtΞt,t+1 (rn,t,t + (1− rn,t,t) νn,t+1)
(
rk,t+1 − r∗k,t+1
)
≡ ναp,t
= 0
.
Financial constraints and slackness conditions:
νω,t = max {νω,t − [νn,tNt − θt (ωt − θgDg,t)]} ,
ν∗ω,t = max
{
ν∗ω,t −
[
ν∗n,tN
∗
t − θ∗t
(
ω∗t − θgD∗g,t
)]}
.
Banks’ balance sheets:
ωt = Dh,t +D∗h,t +Dg,t + Eh,t + Eg,t,
ω∗t = Df,t +D∗f,t +D∗g,t + E∗h,t + E∗g,t.
Equity accumulation:
Eh,t =
Eh,t−1
Eh,t−1 + Eg,t−1
(1− rn,t,t)
(
qt−1Sh,t−1rk,t + q∗t−1Sf,t−1r∗k,t −Dh,t−1rt−1 −D∗h,t−1r∗t−1 −Dg,t−1rg,t−1
)
+ ϖ (ωt−1 +AP1,t−1) ,
E∗h,t =
E∗h,t−1
E∗h,t−1 + E∗g,t−1
(
1− r∗n,t,t
) (
qt−1S∗h,t−1rk,t + q∗t−1S∗f,t−1r∗k,t −Df,t−1rt−1 −D∗f,t−1r∗t−1 −D∗g,t−1r∗g,t−1
)
+ ϖ
(
ω∗t−1 +AP ∗1,t−1
)
.
Government’s budget constraints:
Gt + Γi,t + rtBt−1 +APi,t = Tt + τw,twtLt + τy,tYt +Bt + Li,t,
G∗t + Γ∗i,t + r∗tB∗t−1 +AP ∗i,t = T ∗t + τ∗w,tw∗tL∗t + τ∗y,tY ∗t +B∗t + L∗i,t.
All policy instruments are set to zero in competitive equilibrium.
Market clearing conditions:
Yt + Y ∗t = Ct + C∗t +Gt +G∗t + Γt + Γ∗t + f (Kt−1, It) + f
(
K∗t−1, I
∗
t
)
,
qtSt = qt
(
Sh,t + S∗h,t
)
+AP1,t,
q∗t S
∗
t = q∗t
(
Sf,t + S∗f,t
)
+AP ∗1,t.
Given that financial constraints do not bind and no policy in the steady state, and symmetry of the
two countries, the static version of this model reduce to the model of Backus et al. (1992). To be specific,
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Figure C.1: Response to Home capital quality shock
Note: Black broken lines represent variables that would be realized in a financially frictionless world
(potential variables), red solid lines represent actual variables, and the dotted line represents the steady
state.
steady-state capital, labour, and consumption are solved analytically using the following equations:
KαL(1−α) = δK + C,
χLϕ
((1− h)C)−σ (1− βh) = (1− α)
(
K
L
)α
,
1
β
= α
(
K
L
)α−1
+ 1− δ.
The rest steady-state variables can be solved straightforwardly.
C.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Here, I examine the quantitative behaviours of the model without policy interventions, and the size of
precautionary effects that originate from the OBCs.
C.2.1 Impulse response analysis
I consider responses to two shocks, namely a standard deviation negative Home capital quality shock
ξt and a standard deviation positive Home financial shock θt. I use black broken lines to represent
variables that would be realized in a financially frictionless world (potential variables) and red solid lines
to represent actual variables.
As shown in figure C.1, the capital quality shock creates a deep and persistent global recession. Thanks
to the OBC setting, I can decompose the effects of this shock into two “stages”. In the first stage, the
shock has a real impact shown by the black broken lines. When the financial constraints are binding,
there are second-stage “financial accelerator” effects. In this case, banks must firesale their assets, which
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Figure C.2: Response to Home financial shock
Note: Black broken lines represent variables that would be realized in a financially frictionless world
(potential variables), red solid lines represent actual variables, and the dotted line represents the steady
state.
depresses asset prices and further impairs their net worth. As a result, the financial constraints bind
even tighter. The positive spreads suggest that banks are inefficient financial intermediaries. Overall, the
second-stage effects amplify the first-stage effects. The shock propagates to Foreign via the equalization of
asset returns across countries, as suggested by equation 3.11, and a diversified portfolio. With a portfolio
featuring home bias (αp = 0.4), Foreign banks suffer a smaller loss on their net worth than Home banks.
Figure C.2 shows that the financial shock has only the second-stage impacts on the economy. The shock
tightens the domestic financial constraint so domestic banks firesale their assets. Foreign banks would
like to pick up those assets when the prices are low. However, Foreign banks have limited ability to do so
due to their own financial constraint. Overall, the global investment drops and affects consumption and
output in both countries symmetrically.
No matter whether the financial constraints bind forever or occasionally, the second-stage effects are
much smaller than the first-stage effects. The literature notes at least two reasons why this is the case.
Jakab and Kumhof (2015) suggest that banks in the real world provide financing through money creation
but banks in most models accept pre-existing real resources from savers and then lend them to borrowers.
They find that adding money creation to the model allows the same shocks to have much greater effects
on the non-financial sector. Negro et al. (2017) highlight a role of the nominal rigidity and the zero lower
bound without which the financial friction accounts for a drop in investment, but not in output, thanks
to a rise in consumption.
C.2.2 The precautionary effects of risk
If the financial constraints are always binding, banks always hold the maximum level of assets permitted by
their net worth. However, in the OBCs setting, the amount of assets held by banks is also affected by the
likelihood that financial constraints are binding in the future. This is known as the precautionary effects
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Table C.1: Unconditional Mean (StD) of Home variables
Variables p (Crisis) Bank’s assets Annualized Spread Consumption
EP alike 5.48% 4.72 2.89% 0.316
(0.90) (5.34) (0.22367)
SEP alike 5.28% 4.47 2.33% 0.313
(0.76) (4.62) (0.22375)
Figure C.3: Cooperative fiscal policy under a Home financial shock
of risk. To visualize the effects, I simulate the model with and without integrating over future uncertainty.
The difference between the SEP alike solution and the EP alike solution shows the precautionary effects.
Table C.1 compares the sample mean and the standard deviation of a few variables computed from
the two simulations. First, the precautionary effects reduce the probability of a financial crisis (defined in
the main text) by 0.2%. To avoid being constrained, banks would like to hold fewer assets on average.
If banks do not do this, they suffer from a larger volatility of asset holding. The precautionary effects
also reduce both the mean and the standard deviation of the spread. However, the precautionary
effects are small on non-financial variables. In a smaller open economy model with an occasionally
binding collateral constraint, Mendoza (2010) also finds that long-run business cycle moments are largely
unaffected by precautionary savings. Gertler et al. (2017) show that the nonlinearity induced by the
OBCs are quantitatively small relative to the nonlinearity induced by the bank run mechanism they add
to their early model.
C.3 Fiscal distortion
While policy cost plays an important role in shaping the optimal unconventional policy, there is no hard
evidence to quantify it in the reduced form. Another possible form of policy cost is a distorting effect of a
tax by which the unconventional policy must be financed. To simulate the model in this case, again, I do
not make assumption 3.4.
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Suppose that the most efficient policy, i.e. equity injections, is solely financed by a sales tax, figure
C.3 plots the cooperative responses to a Home financial shock. The unconventional instruments are
not shown because they are only used passively. The true instrument here is the sales subsidy, which
is financed by a negative unconventional policy. This fiscal stimulation boosts investment and hence
asset prices. Banks earn a fortune from their investment and escape from the financial constraints. In
contrast to the unconventional policy, the fiscal policy addresses a financial crisis from the demand side
of capital. However, the credit spreads are very large, suggesting inefficient financial markets. Since
these results are obtained from maximizing welfare, varying the unconventional instrument actively
must worsen welfare because the necessary sales tax to finance the active unconventional policy would
have a strong distortionary effect on the economy. In other words, the distorting tax is an expensive
source of fund to finance the unconventional policy. This result is robust to the nature of the shock, the
chosen unconventional instrument, the chosen fiscal instrument (such as a labour tax), and an alternative
reasonable parameterization of the model such as a smaller Frisch elasticity of labour supply.1 Nonetheless,
this result is not very surprising because the benefits of the unconventional policy are bounded from above
by the welfare losses caused by the second-stage effect of a shock. In this and similar models, such losses
are relatively small (see, Dedola et al. 2013, and appendix C.2) so the benefits of the unconventional
policy are dominated by the distorting effect of the tax. If a smaller proportion of unconventional policy
is financed by the tax, the active unconventional policy becomes cheaper but the active sales subsidy
becomes more expensive. The threshold below which the unconventional policy is active is about 15% of
the unconventional policy financed by the sales tax.
1Brendon et al. (2011) study a similar question where the tax follows a simple rule and the government budget is balanced
by government debts. It is not surprising that the distorting tax plays a minor role in their paper.
Chapter 4
Optimal Unconventional Monetary
Policy rules
4.1 Introduction
As is well known, Ramsey policy is silent regarding implementation. In extreme cases, for instance the
capital control policy analysed in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), there could be no policy intervention
in Ramsey equilibrium. Whether optimal outcomes can be supported by such Ramsey policy, however,
depends on policy implementation.
This chapter follows closely the previous chapter and study implementation of optimal unconventional
monetary policy via simple rules. Based on the intuition of optimal policy obtained in the previous
chapter, I find that the Ramsey policy can be characterised by a rule responding to gaps in asset prices.
Unfortunately, this rule requires knowledge of asset prices that would be realized in a world free of
financial friction so cannot be used to guide unconventional monetary policy in practice. In searching of
appropriate practical rules, I find the best rule being the one proposed by Foerster (2015), i.e., policy
responding to its own lag and credit spreads. I argue that the superiority of this rule comes from its
effects on the expectation of asset prices, not the slow unwinding suggested by Foerster (2015).
The contribution of this chapter is to design optimal simple rules based on intuitions of Ramsey
policy and formally evaluate different simple rules. I also show that insights for policy design apply to
similar unconventional policies, i.e., public asset purchases, and equity injections and lending to banks.
By contrast, related papers in the literature often consider public asset purchases only. And they have
different focuses. Dedola et al. (2013) focuses on the difference between cooperative and noncooperative
policy using a relatively inefficient credit spread rule. They find that the noncooperative policy may
feature too large or too small policy response parameters, depending on the policy costs. This chapter
does not examine the noncooperative policy because searching policy parameters in the model with
occasionally binding constraints is computationally expensive. Furthermore, rules considered exclusively
in this chapter are unlikely to feature noncooperative equilibrium that is significantly different from that
of Dedola et al. (2013). Ellison and Tischbirek (2014) and Quint and Rabanal (2017) focus on asset
purchase programs in normal times. The former paper jointly optimises the parameters in the interest
rate and the asset purchase rules while the latter optimises the asset purchase rules conditional on a
estimated Taylor rule.
In the next section, I examine desirability of three rules against their unconditional welfare loss. Then,
To build intuitions of the welfare implications, I compare impulse responses of the economy under each of
these rules. I conclude this chapter in the last section.
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Table 4.1: Unconditional welfare loss under optimized simple rules
Asset pur. Dis. win. Equity inj.
Spread rule 6.84 (150) 7.43 (150) 4.30 (115)
AR spread rule 5.80 (150, 0.9) 6.20 (150, 0.9) 4.18 (115, 0.9)
Price rule 3.83 (450) 4.66 (450) 2.49 (450)
Note: The numbers outside the brackets are base points of the unconditional welfare loss under an
optimized rule relative to that under the optimal allocation. The numbers inside the brackets are the
parameters of the optimized rules.
4.2 Simple rule design
Based on the model studied in chapter 3, I consider three simple rules. The benchmark rule that has
been most popular in the literature is
Pi,t = κEt (rk,t+1 − rt) (4.1)
in Home and similarly in Foreign where Pi,t is the policy spending proportional to domestic asset value, i
indexes public asset purchases, equity injections and lending to banks, and parameter κ determines the
aggressiveness of the interventions. I refer to this rule as the spread rule. Foerster (2015) proposes an
improvement on equation 4.1 by adding an autoregressive term (AR spread rule):
Pi,t = κ (1− ρP)Et (rk,t+1 − rt) + ρPPi,t−1. (4.2)
As discussed in chapter 3, unconventional monetary policy in this model works via a capital gain channel.
It’s therefore natural to consider the rule that responds to asset price gaps (price rule)
Pi,t = −κ (ln qt − ln qt,potential) , (4.3)
where qt,potential is the asset price that would occur in a world free of financial constraints, and ln qt −
ln qt,potential is the asset price gaps (in percentage). The negative sign before κ reflects the fact that the
asset price is low during financial stresses.
To evaluate each of these rules for each of the policies, I calculate a second order approximation of
the model, including the global welfare loss defined as
minWELg ≡
−Et
∑∞
j=t β
g
t,t+j
1
2
[
(ct+j−hct+j−1)1−σ
1−σ − χ
l1+ϕ
t+j
1+ϕ +
(c∗t+j−hc∗t+j−1)1−σ
1−σ − χ
l∗1+ϕ
t+j
1+ϕ
]
.
The unconditional welfare loss is calculated by simulating the model for 10000 periods and taking the
average. Again, I employ the method of Holden (2016a,b) to allow occasionally binding constraint.
The unconditional welfare loss and the optimized policy rule parameters are reported in table 4.1.
Once more, the government needs to pay a reduced form cost with τ=0.01. First note that, regardless
of the rule, the most efficient policy is again equity injections, followed by public asset purchases, and
discount window lending. Second, regardless of the policy, the price rule always generate smallest welfare
loss among all three. The AR spread rule is an improvement over the naive spread rule but only at a
margin.
To better understand how these rules differ, it is useful to consider the impulse response of the
economy under each rule. For the purpose of illustration, I only show the responses of equity injections
in figures 4.1 and 4.2. Consider first the spread rule shown in red. Subject to either shock, the spread
rule is not aggressive enough to stabilize the financial sector, leaving a significant gap in asset prices and
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Figure 4.1: Response to Home capital quality shock, with different policy rules
Note: The gap variable is the difference between the actual variable that is realized in the model and its
counterpart that would be realized in a world without the financial constraints. C denotes consumption
and Q denotes the asset price.
Figure 4.2: Response to Home financial shock, with different policy rules
Note: The gap variable is the difference between the actual variable that is realized in the model and its
counterpart that would be realized in a world without the financial constraints. C denotes consumption,
Q denotes the asset price.
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spreads. As a result, there is also a substantial fluctuation in the consumption gap. However, it exits
from interventions at roughly the same speed as the Ramsey results. Adding an AR term (shown in blue)
does not necessary make the interventions more persistent as we expect. For example, AR spread rule
exits faster than the spread rule upon a capital quality shock. Generally, the AR spread rule features
hump-shape responses that are stronger than the naive spread rule. The hump-shape responses seems
capturing the observation that central banks tend to strengthen unconventional policy at the early stage
of the crisis. By employing the AR spread rule, a central bank allows relatively large spreads and price
gaps in the first few periods, but makes them smaller thereafter by better anchoring the expectation of
asset prices. Therefore a central bank faces additional trade-offs between the short run and the long run
financial efficiency, which pins down the optimal AR parameter. With optimized parameters, the AR
spread rule reduces fluctuations in consumption and improve the life-time utility. This improvement is
particularly clear for the capital quality shock.
The price rule (shown in green) characterises the Ramsey outcomes. There is barely any fluctuation in
the consumption gaps, the asset price gaps, and the spreads. This is expected because the unconventional
policy works through the capital gain channel. The price rule still generates a substantial welfare loss
because the government cannot customize rule parameters to shocks with different nature and sources.
Consequently, facing a Home shock, interventions are relatively weak in Home but relatively strong in
Foreign, and visa versa when facing a Foreign shock. In addition, the price rule is not practicable facing
a capital quality shock, or any other real shock, because the potential asset price is not observable.
4.3 Conclusion
This chapter completes the discussion of optimal unconventional monetary policy by studying how optimal
policy can be implemented in practice. I find that a central bank should respond to asset price gaps
facing a financial shock but respond to the credit spread with a certain degree of inertia facing other
shocks. In choosing the optimal degree of inertia, a central bank face additional trade-offs between short
run and long run financial efficiency.
It may be natural to consider a policy shock in this chapter. For example, there have been concerns
that excessive unconventional interventions may create asset price inflation. I left this exercise to further
research, however, because policy shocks bring no interesting dynamics in this model. A positive shock
on the policy perfectly crowds out private funds and hence cannot push asset prices beyond their optimal
level. Because of this unexpected crowding out effect, though, the policy must be longer lasting.
Conclusion
In this thesis, I address two issues in the field of international macroeconomics. The first is the PPP
puzzle. I propose an empirical model called integral correction mechanism (ICM) to capture real exchange
rate dynamics. It implies that the real exchange rate responds to an unidentified shock non-monotonically.
The real exchange rate reverts to its long-run equilibrium quickly in the short-run but persistently move
around the equilibrium. Hence the PPP puzzle can be understood by distinguishing between degrees of
persistence in the short-run and the long-run. The micro-foundation underlying this type of dynamics is
partially a time-varying price elasticity of tradable goods such that international trade is less responsive
to terms of trade in the short-run. The second issue is the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative
unconventional monetary policy. I suggest that unconventional policy should be designed to address the
financial constraint that banks face. The central bank should exit slowly from the policy slowly even after
a financial crisis has passed. In practice, the central bank can respond to asset price gaps if observable,
or credit spreads with inertia. Cross-country policy cooperation is welfare improving. The welfare gain
depends on policy cost.
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